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c. 1976
c. 1977
c. 1978
c. 1979
c. 1980
~IMELINE - SELECTED KEY EVENTS
0 Human Resources personnel in Manufacturing began
studying quality circles and other employee
participation programs.
Fuji Xerox responds to competitive difficulties by
creating the New Xerox Movement, a program for
competitive renewal built around quality.
0
0 Senior corporate executives begin visiting Japan to
study Fuji Xerox's improvement activities and
collect information about key competitors.
ACTWU officials and Xerox Human Resource and
Manufacturing managers begin joint exploration of
potential designs for employee participation
activities.
0
0 Plant managers in Manufacturing begin informal "rap
sessions" to explore organizational improvement
activities.
to study employee0 A corporate task force
participation is created.
A senior corporate staff position for
organizational effectiveness is created to' drive
and coordinate employee participation activities.
0
0 service Work Teams begin to be established in u.s.
Marketing Group.
Xerox and ACTWUreach agreement in their collective
bargaining negotiations to experiment with a QWL
effort. A joint, parallel oversight structure is
created to manage these activities. Xerox agrees
that no employees will lose their jobs as a result
of QWL-generated productivity improvements.
0
0 A six-step Problem-Solving Process is developed.
External consultants are chosen.0
0 Trainer/Coordinators are chosen from both union and
management ranks to deliver problem-solving and
group process training and to provide day-to-day
help to employee problem-solving groups.
Trainer/Coordinators are co-managed by the ACTWU
General Shop Chairman and a mid-level Xerox
Manager.
iv.
c. 1981
0 Employee QWL training begins, on a voluntary basis.
The manufacturing and engineering units are
combined into Manufacturing and Development. Frank
Pipp, a role-model manager/change agent is placed
in charge of the new unit.
0
0 Manufacturing sends Benchmarking team to Japan.
Management Effectiveness Workshop is developed by
D&M and delivered to all managers in the unit,
including senior executives.
0
0 Corporate staff creates a blueprint for becoming a
total quality company, modeled on the Fuji Xerox
experience.
0 Over 90 problem-solving groups are established in
the four main manufacturing plants in Webster, New
York. Initially, hygiene factors are emphasized in
shopfloor problem-solving.
A special Cost study Team begins analysis of Wire
Harness production activities in an effort to
prevent outsourcing of 180 jObs.
0
0 Organizational Effectiveness Conference is created
to facilitate information sharing and coordination
of change activities. Trainer/Coordinators start
Organizational Effectiveness Network.
0 "The Summit" and "The Corpora te Forum" are
developed to facilitate communication between Xerox
senior executives and ACTWU leadership.
Development and Manufacturing commissions a task
force to redesign the performance appraisal system.
0
0 Management Style Survey is developed to provide
behavioral feedback from subordinates to managers.
An Organizational Effectiveness Unit is created in
engineering to drive the implementation of QWL in
the unit.
0
0 A voluntary staff reduction program is set up to
significantly reduce the ratio of indirect to
direct employees.
Managerial values at odds with QWL activities and,
at times result in open resistance to the program.
0
v.
c. 1982
c. 1983
0 A series of slide shows ("The Choice Is Ours") is
created to. explain Xerox's competitive
disadvantages to the unionized workforce. ACTWU
leadership helps in the design of the presentations
and in their delivery to small groups of employees.
Involuntary staff reductions begin when the
voluntary reduction program does not produce the
needed results. Reductions affect both unionized
ad exempt personnel.
0
0 Wire Harness Cost study Team identifies over $3
million in potential savings. Xerox decides not to
outsource jobs.
Problem-solving teams are set up, with difficulty,
in the engineering (Development) side of the firm.
0
0 Xerox Corporate Management Committee approves total
quality as the quiding business principle of the
firm.
0 1983 contract with ACTWU is ratified. Contract
contains a no-layoff provision and requires the use
of Cost study Teams in potential outsourcing
si tuations. Contract also contains a one-year wage
freeze, restrictive absenteeism control program and
co-pay medical changes and allows for the hiring of
a temporary workforce.
A new performance appraisal system is implemented
in Development and Manufacturing; Performance
appraisal training of managers/supervisors begins.
0
0 Participation in problem-solving groups begins to
level off. QWL training made mandatory; polarizes
the unionized workforce.
0 Xerox Teamwork Day is created by Organizational
Effectiveness unit in engineering to celebrate the
successes of the problem-solving groups in the
Development area; 40 teams participate.
David Kearns meets with top 25 senior managers to
discuss the firm's competitive position; to put
forth the notion that a total quality program will
be the method for improving the firm's performance;
and to discuss the basic elements of such a
program. Consensus on such a program is reached;
it will be called Leadership Through Quality.
0
vi.
c. 1984
c. 1985
/
0 A Quality Implementation Team and a Quality
Training Task Force are set up, with members drawn
from all major business units.
A nine-step Quality Improvement Process is
developed by the quality strategy task forces, as
well as the Leadership Through Quality
implementation strategy. Top 25 senior managers
given opportunity to make changes to the strategy.
A strategy document - "The Green Book" - is issued.
0
0 Leadership Through Quality training program is
developed.
A Quality function is created, with vice Presidents
for Quality and Quality training and implementation
specialists assigned to each major business unit.
0
0 Employee attitude survey leads to redesign of
employee participation activities and structures.
Quality Specialists and Organizational
Effectiveness Specialists (previously called QWL
Trainer/Coordinators) taught Leadership Through
Quality training program.
0
0 Training of employees in quality processes begins,
starting at the top of the organization following a
training cascade philosophy and the LUTI technique.
. Training is to be mandatory for all.
Quality Network is. created in Development &
Manufacturing for Quality Specialists. Quality
Specialists learn facilitation and organizational
change skills.
0
0 Quality implementation oversight committee
(composed of union officials, senior managers,
Quality Trainers and Organizational Effectiveness
Specialist) set up in Development and Manufacturing
to address ACTWU concern over mandatory training.
Manufacturing participates in Xerox Teamwork Day
for the first time.
0
0 u.S. Marketing Group modifies its performance
appraisal system to require all employees to have
objectives related to quality and to the
improvement of their work processes. Additionally,
"satisfying customer needs" becomes the major
criterion for success, not "meeting objectives."
vii.
c. 1986
c.. 1987
0 Facilitation skills manual - "Mining Group Gold" -
and associated training program created to address
managerial weaknesses in facilitation and group
development skills.
u.s. Marketing Group participates in Xerox Teamwork
Day for the first time.
0
0 PROSHARE gainsharing program created for Service
Work Teams.
0 Role model manager characteristics begin to be
developed. Management Replacement Program modified
to incorporate evolving role model characteristics.
Merit review and reward process altered for
executives to allow the length of time between
consecutive increases to be varied.
0
0 u.s. Marketing Group recognizes that its functional
structure (sales, service, administration)
negatively impacts customer satisfaction.
Leadership Through Quality training completed for
all managers and most other employees in
Development and Manufacturing.
0
0 Personnel contracting strategy used to increase
Wbuy-in" of key managers to the quality program.
Partnership concept developed in u.s. Marketing
Group to focus District Managers on the customer
and encourage cooperation between sales, service
and administration.
0
0 u.s. Marketing Group creates a bonus program that
ties the compensation of key managers to customer
satisfaction targets of their unit.
Merit review and reward process altered for
remainder of salaried exempt population to allow
for variance in reward timing.
0
0 Team Excellence a team-centered
recognition program - is implemented.
andreward
viii.
c. 1988 0
0
c. 1989 0
Leadership Through Quality training completed for
all employees in the u.s. Marketing Group.
Baldrige application process begins.
Gainsharing program tied to "Common Goals" and
customer satisfaction put in place for all non-
managerial employees in U.S. Marketing Group's
District operations.
ix.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Xerox Corporation's Business Products and
Systems division was named a recipient of the Malcolm Baldrige
National Quality Award. This award was created by the Malcolm
Baldrige National Quality Improvement Act of 1987 (Public Law
100-107) to promote quality awareness, recognize quality achieve-
ments and publicize successful quality strategies - in short, to
launch a national campaign to revitalize American industry by
encouraging quality improvement.
For Xerox, the Baldrige Award was the culmination of a
decade-long process of organizational renewal. Between 1959,
when the firm (then called Haloid Xerox, Inc.) introduced the
world's first plain paper copier, and the mid 1970's Xerox was
the overwhelmingly dominant company in its industry. So strong
was its position, that it controlled, in most estimates, well
over 85 percent of the worldwide market for copiers.
In the 1970's, however, Xerox's position began to erode.
Japanese corporations aggressively entered the low end of the
copier market with high quality, low price machines. American
competitors, IBM and Kodak, attacked the high end of the market.
Both foreign and domestic competitors were assisted in their
efforts to challenge Xerox by a Federal Trade Commission campaign
to break Xerox's control over copier technology. This campaign
resulted in a series of agreements in which Xerox agreed to make
key patents available to competitors and to stop providing
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favorable pricing schedules to customers leasing several Xerox
machines.
Xerox's competitive position was further damaged by the
internal excesses acquired during its period of meteoric growth
in the 1960's. With a virtual monopoly on copier technology and
a marketplace increasingly captivated by the utility of copiers,
Xerox growth during the 1960's was the stuff of business legends.
In 1959, when the 914 copier was introduced, Haloid Xerox's
annual revenues were approximately $30 million.
corporation's annual sales exceeded $1 billion.
By 1969, Xerox
Such growth in
sales was paralleled by growth in workforce and facilities.
During this period, the appropriateness of such things as inter-
nal structures, direct-to indirect staff ratios, product develop-
ment procedures and costs, manufacturing procedures and costs or
internal controls was not a central concern. The size of the
revenue stream occasioned by the firm's market dominance masked
internal inefficiencies. Indeed, these were accepted as a
necessary concomitant to rapid growth -- something that would be
dealt with at a later time. Additionally, the firm's success
created an inward focused culture, increasingly characterized by
bureaucratic structure and procedure and political managerial
behavior.
As a result of these factors, Xerox worldwide market share
dropped sharply to well below 50 percent by the end of the
1970's. While the firm's revenue stream remained strong, due
largely to the gradual conversion of leased machines to sale,
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growth began to slow. Company documents reported average annual
growth rates of approximately 23 percent for revenues and 20
percent for profits during the mid-1960's to mid-1970's. Over
the latter half of the 1970's, however, these average annual
growth rates had declined to approximately 16 percent and 14
percent, respectively. By 1980, these trends began to be re-
fleeted in the firm's return on assets (ROA), which declined
steadily from 19 percent in 1980 to 8.4 percent in 1983.*
Recognizing that these trends, if unchecked, would serious-
ly threaten Xerox's viability, the firm began an intensive
examination of its internal practices. It was assisted in this
effort by a high level consulting team from McKinsey and Company.
That analysis began a ten-year process of change that signifi-
cantly altered the way Xerox managed its business. strategic
Business units focused on different market sectors were created
to shorten product development time and to tailor market strate-
gies to sector differences. A downsizing program significantly
reduced both the size of the firm's workforce and the ratio of
indirect to direct workers, while a cost reduction program took
hundreds of millions of dollars out of other components of the
firm's cost base. Customer needs and satisfaction became a
driving force within the organization, leading to changes in
internal practices and the reallocation of resources.
Participative structures were created to encourage employee
*LTQ: A Total Quality Process for Xerox Corporation - 1986 Internal
Publication
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involvement and labor-management cooperation in performance-
related problem-solving. In sum, a fundamental cultural trans-
formation of the organization was wrought, a transformation built
around quality improvement that touched every aspect of Xerox and
continues apace today.
This report summarizes the findings of a study that exam-
ined the process of renewal at Xerox. The primary objective of
this effort was a desire to understand the human resource aspects
of a transformation to a total quality focus. The study is,
however, exploratory in nature. It does not purport to test
specific hypothesis about organization change, but seeks merely
to "unbundle" the change process at Xerox. Conceptually, this
"unbundling" effort has been heavily influenced by Noel Tichy's
'work on strategic organizational change.. In it he describes
organizations as being composed of three fundamental systems:
the technical, the political, and the cultural. Pressure for
change may exist in one or more of these systems. However, the
other system(s) may be "out of phase" with the system in tension
and may not be supportive of change without effective managerial
intervention. Managing strategic change, or understanding it as
an observer, is therefore a matter of sorting out issues of
technical design, political allocation and cultural values. This
study attempts to examine the renewal effort at Xerox in these
terms.
Data collection has largely been accomplished through the
*Tichy, N. Manaaina Strateaic Chanae New York, John Wiley & Bons, 1983.
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vehicle of ethnographic interviews with key change agents. A
modest list of potential interviewees was generated in discus-
sions with Dominick Argona, a manager intimately involved in
planning and leading the renewal effort in Manufacturing, and
Deborah K. Smith, current vice President for Human Resources &
Support Services at the firm's Webster, New York location.
Discussion with the initial interviewees generated a rolling list
of subsequent interview candidates. In line with the exploratory
nature of the research, interviewees were then contacted, if they
could explicate a new dimension of the renewal effort, or could
corroborate the picture painted by others. Thirty in-depth, on-
site interviews were undertaken, ranging in length from one and
one-half to three hours. These were augmented with numerous
short discussions with Xerox employees, many of them serendipi-
tous as the interviewers spent time at various Xerox locations.
Interviewees were located at the firm's Webster, New York manu-
facturing and development facilities, its Xerox Square offices in
downtown Rochester and the Syracuse District office of the u.S.
Marketing Group. Intervicwees were promised confidentiality to
encourage candor. As such, names are cited only with the permis-
sion of the respondent.
5
/:I:I. ~HE PROCESS OF CHANGE: SOHE CR:IT:ICAL EVENTS
The beginning of the performance turnaround of Xerox is
frequently tied to the announcement, in late 1983, of a formal
quality improvement program called "Leadership Through Quality"
(LTQ). There can be little doubt that this program was, indeed,
a watershed event in the firm's renewal process. Leadership
Through Quality was an outgrowth of Xerox's strategic decision to
adopt quality as a "fundamental business principle" - to tie its
hopes for future success in the marketplace to the quality of its
products and services. The essence of the firm's commitment to
quality was captured in the Xerox Quality Policy:
Xerox is a quality company. Quality is the basic
business principle for Xerox. Quality means pro-
viding our external and internal customers with
innovative products and services that fully satisfy
their requirements. Quality improvement is the job
of every Xerox employee.
As a process, Leadership Through Quality had three founda-
tional components. First, it defined a nine-step Quality Im-
provement Process (QIP) that was to be used by all employees and
operating units to continuously align work output with customer
(both internal and external) needs. Second, it mandated the use
of asystematic and participative Problem Solving Process (PSP)
to encourage rigor, comprehensiveness and effectiveness in
problem resolution. And third, it mandated the use of competi-
tive benchmarking for all work activities and defined success in
meeting customer requirements as, minimally, parity with the best
practices found in industry.
Leadership Through Quality was an outgrowth of Xerox's
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recognition that the rapid turnaround of its business fortunes
was not solely a matter of structural reorganization and cost
.
base reduction. These activities were certainly necessary pre-
conditions for long-term effectiveness in the market. However
observations of the internal operations of the firm, particularly
the pace and dynamics of change, by external consultants and,
ultimately senior management, suggested that the malaise at Xerox
went far deeper than its structural misalignment and
overstaffing. The years of technological dominance, virtual
"monopoly" market status and unrestrained and seemingly limitless
profit growth had led to what some have described as an "attitude
of complacency and self-satisfaction". Put simply, many employ-
~ees in Xerox, particularly mid to upper-level managers and
technical professionals, had come to believe that they were the
best in the business.
In such an environment, change in basic business practices
and processes is not easy to accomplish. Where strongly held
beliefs and assumptions support one set of behaviors, it is
difficult to bring about the display of new behaviors by merely
asserting that they are necessary and modifying the structural
context of day-to-day activity. In fact, old habits simply
continue in the new structure. Thus, Xerox concluded that a
fundamental change in its culture was necessary if the firm was
to again dominate its industry. Leadership Through Quality was
designed to be the vehicle through which the cultural transforma-
tion of the firm would be accomplished.
7
/The launch of Leadership Through Quality was not, however,
the beginning of the corporate renewal process.
.
In fact, Leader-
ship Through Quality built significantly on activities that had
begun years earlier. Both employee participation in problem
solving and benchmarking can be traced to the late 1970's and
were brought into the firm in a piecemeal fashion by employees
deep in the organization who sought improvement in their areas of
responsibility. Therefore, Leadership Through Quality was merely
one step, albeit a very significant one, in an evolutionary
renewal process.
The Earlv Years: The Vision Takes Shape
The notion of using employee participation to improve
organizational-performance was first considered at Xerox in 1976.
As noted above, in the mid-1970'S, it was becoming increasingly
evident that something was happening to Xerox's position in the
marketplace. Competitive inroads by Japanese copier manufactur-
ers were leading to fluctuations in demand for Xerox copiers.
This performance decline was most strongly felt in Xerox's
manufacturing operations, where fluctuation in the demand for
copiers was leading the firm to continuously adjust the size of
its manufacturing workforce.
At about the same time that Xerox was experiencing these
sYmptoms of competitive decline, the American business community
was becoming increasingly interested in the managerial methods of
the Japanese. A technique that received considerable press at
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this time was the quality circle and the potential of this method
did not escape the attention of Xerox. Two employees in the
Manufacturing Training and Employee Services department -
Dominick Argona and Sam Malone, the department head - began to
mull over the utility of quality circles for Xerox. They were
intrigued by the notion that problem solving by small groups of
employees could have an incremental impact on organizational
performance. They also recognized that such efforts to involve
lower-level employees more fully were contrary to the Xerox way
of managing its business. Xerox, at this time, had a top-down
culture that clearly emphasized managerial decision making and
problem solving.
Argona and Malone took their initial explorations of
quality circles to Malone's boss, John Foley, then Vice President
of Personnel for Xerox's Webster, New York manufacturing opera-
tions. They argued that the firm's recent performance was
beginning to suggest a need for change, for "doing things differ-
ently." They were not sure that quality circles were the way to
bring about change, or whether the technique was even applicable
to Xerox's internal environment, but they thought the idea had
sufficient merit that they should pursue it more fully.
Foley agreed. He told Malone that while he himself knew
little of quality circles, the idea was interesting and he
thought Xerox should know more about it. Additionally, he
authorized Malone to "steal" some money from existing projects to
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fund the effort and to come to him for help if any roadblocks
were encountered.
Argona took the lead in the effort to better understand
quality circles and quality of work life, another related concept
that was receiving attention in the business press. He went to
seminars, attended conferences, talked to companies that were
experimenting with the concepts and read as much as he could.
his knowledge base grew, he channeled the information to Foley
As
and reinforced the conviction that they were on the right path in
considering participative activities.
In 1978, Argona's thinking about participation was enriched
by an enlargement of his job responsibilities. Concerned about
potential discrimination in hiring practices, Xerox had put
together a team of Ph.D. level sociologists and psychologists to
create and validate the firm's hiring tests and procedures. It
was felt that this group needed a manager who could relate well
to "academics" and, as Argona had completed a Masters degree in
educational psychology, he was asked to take responsibility for
the team.
As he began to work with them, he became increasingly
"fascinated with their education, their background, and their
thought processes about the psychology and sociology of the
business." The team "was a mirror to look at the organization
from a different perspective" and Argona took full advantage of
it.
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These early staff explorations into the form participation
might take in Xerox were enriched by the involvement of several
influential line managers. As Xerox performance declined, Tom
McCune, the manager of the Supplies Manufacturing Organization
started a series of "rap sessions" for general managers to share
information about organizational improvement and talk through
change efforts. These informal sessions were attended by many of
the key plant managers at the Webster site. Argona was asked to
participate as an "expert" resource to the group. In doing so,
however, he was able to begin influencing line attitudes toward
participation and to test staff ideas for how participation
should progress against line experience.
In these early explorations of quality circles, one fact
jumped out at Argona and his colleagues: "...75 percent of the
projects that were going on in the United states no longer
existed after three years. In other words, they completely
failed." Quality circles were an interesting idea, but they had
no staying power. Argona's research suggested that the reason
for this was that quality circle programs were typically volun-
tary overlays onto existing organizational infra-structures. In
most implementations, no attention was given to changing aspects
to the prevailing internal culture and structures that might be
incompatible with quality circles. Without the creation of the
necessary support systems, the circles were doomed to failure.
To Argona and his colleagues it became evident "that quality
circles (alone) were not going to get us where we needed to go."
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They came to view them as simply convenient "process entry"
activities - a type of participation that could be used to
acquaint employees with the notion of involvement and to give
them some of the necessary skills to be effective at it. Howev-
er, once the labor force had some familiarity with participation,
it would be necessary to introduce methods that took account of
the larger systemic and cultural aspects of the work environment.
One of these, socio-technical work redesign, Argona had learned
about in Norway and saw as a natural next stage to quality
circles.
Beyond concern with the design of shop-floor work improve-
ment activities, Argona and his colleagues spent a great deal of
time thinking aoout the larger industrial relations-context for
work participation. Xerox was (and is) a union company; its
manufacturing workers were largely represented by the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU). Relations between
the company and the union had generally been cordial, with mutual
respect shown by both parties. That, however, had been during
times of great corporate success and prosperity. It was becoming
clear that the depth and sophistication of the changes that would
be necessary to turn the firm around would require sacrifice by
everyone in the firm. Clearly to Argona and his colleagues, the
union would have to be intimately involved in designing and
implementing these changes or the chances of success were small.
With some delicacy they began to bring ACTWU officials into their
discussions in the hope that, together, they could devise an
12
acceptable structure for participation.
While this grass roots interest in participation was
developing in the Webster manufacturing operations, the senior
management of the corporation was coming to recognize the value
of participative methods. In 1962, Rank Xerox (a partnership
created in 1956 betwe~n Haloid and The Rank Organizat~o~ of the
United Kingdom) and Fuji Photo Film of Japan created an indepen-
dent firm, Fuji Xerox, to develop and market copiers in the Far
East. After spectacular early success that matched that of its
parent, Fuji Xerox ran into competitive difficulties in the early
1970's as a result of the worldwide oil crisis. To survive, it
became clear that the firm would have to significantly improve
both its cost position and its product quality. In 1976, Fuji
Xerox responded by creating the New Xerox Movement, a program
designed to commit the company unequivocally to the pursuit of
quality. Over a four year period, Fuji Xerox systematically
created an organization built around quality. So successful was
this effort that, in 1980, Fuji Xerox was awarded the Deming
Prize for Quality, Japan's highest quality award.
The competitive improvement efforts of Fuji Xerox were
watched closely by senior Xerox officers. Chairman Peter
McColough and David Kearns (who would become President and CEO of
Xerox in 1977 and its chairman in 1985) visited Japan many times
during the late 1970's to examine firsthand Fuji Xerox's product
development efforts and its quality improvement processes.
Additionally, Tony Kobayashi, President of Fuji Xerox, provided
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the Xerox corporate executives with introductions and access to
other Japanese firms so that they could better understand the
competitive forces arrayed against them.
out of these visits grew a realization that employee
participation could be of great benefit to Xerox, particularly
given the "precipice of bad results that was descending upon" the
firm. Indeed, after one of his visits to Japan Chairman
McColough is reputed to have said to his corporate Vice President
of Personnel, "...get me some of that. I've been to Japan. I've
seen what they are doing. Get me some of that." He was refer-
ring to employee involvement.
hint.
Douglas Reid, the newly appointed VP of Personnel took the
A corporate task force under Joe Charleton was set up to
study employee involvement. After examining the issue for about
a year, the task force "recommended that a corporate position for
organizational effectiveness be established to drive employee
involvement" in the firm.
In 1979, such a position was created and Hal Tragash a
senior personnel staff member from the marketing side of the
organization was asked to fill it. Tragash accepted, although
admitting that he knew little of employee involvement. He
quickly put into action a straightforward implementation strategy
that had worked for him in the past: "educate myself, educate
others, find out what we could do and get some experiments
underway, pUblicize them, support them and diffuse (the
results)."
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To educate himself about the concept, Tragash turned to
professionals whose job was to train people about participation.
These were largely external consultants, such as Richard Walton
at Harvard and sid Rubenstein, who had assisted General Motors in
its efforts to implement a participative system at its Tarrytown,
New York plant. He also drew upon the expertise within Xerox,
especially Argona and his colleagues.
After about three months in the job, Tragash felt he knew
enough to ask the right questions. He asked to make a presenta-
tion to the Xerox management committee. senior ACTWU officials
were also in attendance at this meeting. In the meeting, he
described what he thought the essence of participation was and
how it could help the firm. He said, "Employee involvement ...
rests on a foundation of the Theory Y philosophy (of management)
and (requires) the building of trust and credibility between all
of the people involved at work. You (have) a choice (when)
creating involvement from one-way communication (downward) to a
German Works Council-type representative structure or an employ-
ee-owned company. How far do you want to go?" He was told to
"take it at least as far as joint problem solving, (with) maybe
some autonomy in work. (We) don't want an employee-owned company
and we don't want a Works council-type environment."
Anthony Costanza, the General Shop Chairman of the union
was present at that meeting. Although he and his colleagues in
the union leadership group had been having discussions with
Argona and his group, Tragash's presentation took him aback.
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"According to Tragash, Costanza commented that "when I first heard
him (Tragash), I thought the guy was talking Greek..."
Costanza apparently caught on quickly. In 1980, shortly
after the meeting, the union and Xerox reached an agreement in
their collective bargaining negotiations "to experiment with what
was then termed a quality of work-life (QWL) effort. The focus
was on creating shop-floor problem solving groups comparable to
quality circles.
In the negotiations around the QWL issue, the union was
adamant that it would agree to cooperate onlY if control of the
program was equally shared by union and management. The company
agreed, assuring the union "that oversight would indeed be joint,
that management saw QWL as something more than a short-lived
program, and that QWL would be kept separate from the management
structure, the union structure, and the collective bargaining
relationship. * The employee involvement program would be run
by a parallel process that would be separate from the day-to-day
industrial relations and management activities found in the firm.
Additionally, reflecting another union concern, Xerox agreed
"that no employees would lose their jobs due to productivity
gains generated by QWL teams."*
*Tracino a Transformation in Industrial Relations, u.s. Dept. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs, BLMR 123,
1988, p. S.
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Employee Participation Is Formalized: OWL Activities Begin
Authorization to proceed with the implementation of the QWL
program was now in hand. As the manufacturing area was to be the
test bed for the new participative activities, Argona and his
colleagues began the process of selecting a consultant to advise
them on the start-up as their first order of business. Argona's
research had suggested that when implementing participatory
programs, it was important to use the services of an external
consultant. He also found, however, that it was important to
augment those services by developing an internal consulting
capacity within the organization. By having both types of change
agents available, they could be "leveraged off each other" to
move the program forward. Internal consultants were knowledge-
able about the cultural, political and interpersonal nuances of
organizational life, as well as the technical jargon of the
business, and thus could move and act in ways an external person
could not. On the other hand, external consultants brought
objectivity and a sense of perspective and could often say things
that an internal consultant would find worrisome.
Following the agreement that the QWL program would be
managed jointly, the union and company worked together to select
an external consultant. Sid Rubenstein of Participative Systems
was chosen and he and a colleague, Peter Lazes, worked with the
union and the company to 1) design an appropriate oversight
structure for the participative activities; 2) help develop the
shop-floor problem solving teams; 3) provide necessary training
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in group process skills and problem-solving; and 4) work with
union and management to identify the infrastructural changes
needed to support the QWL activities. Rubenstein eventually left
the project, and the work was continued by Lazes.
The overall design has been described in detail elsewhere*
For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that oversight was to
be accomplished in each plant implementing the QWL program
through a union-management plant advisory committee (PAC) and a
network of department-level steering committees. Overall coord i-
nation between plants was to be accomplished through a county-
wide (Monroe county) planning and policy committee. Each
problem-solving team was to consist of six or seven employees and
one supervisor from a specific work area. The teams were autho-
rized to meet for two hours per week to identify, analyze and
solve problems in their work area.
entirely voluntary.
Membership on a team was
A point of considerable discussion in the 1979 to 1980 time
period was the size of the initial implementation. The litera-
ture on these types of programs suggested a limited roll-out -
possibly one pilot problem-solving group in a test plant or one
such group in each of the major plants at a site. The Xerox
plant managers in Webster would have none of this when the actual
implementation began. First of all, they said, they had been
talking about this for some time, thought they knew what they
*Lazes, P. and A. Costanza, "Cutting Costs Without Layoffs Through
Union-Management Collaboration," National Productivity Review, Autumn
1983, pp. 362-370.
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were getting into, had a clear need for internal improvements and
were, therefore, ready to go. Second, with the competitive
culture then in existence at Xerox, no plant manager wanted to be
left behind, if the QWL process truly helped performance as they
thought it would. Thus, the decision was made to go with a full,
As Argona described it, "This was like goingfour plant la\lnch.
at 60 miles per hour in a stagecoach, and suddenly there's a
cliff. There was no stopping; over we went."
Xerox knew that success in setting up a QWL program re-
quired considerably more than merely defining a structure for
participation. The employees who would be asked to join the
problem-solving groups generally had little, if any, experience
in this type of environment. They would have to be carefully
trained to identify and analyze problems appropriately and to
understand the nuances of group dynamics. To this end, Argona
and his staff developed a six step process that would be used by
the groups to 1) identify and select a problem; 2) analyze the
problem; 3) generate potential solutions to the problem; 4)
select an appropriate solution from among the possibilities and
plan for its implementation; 5) implement the solution, and 6;
evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation.
known as PSP, the Problem-Solving Process.
This became
To deliver the problem-solving and group process training
and to provide day-to-day help to the problem-solving groups, a
"Trainer/Coordinator" role was created. Following the agreement
that QWL activities would be jointly administered, occupants of
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/this role were chosen from both union and management ranks.
Fifty percent of the Trainer/Coordinators were chosen by plant
management and fifty percent by the ACTWU General Shop Chairman
and his advisors. Given the training flavor of the role, selec-
tion criteria tended to emphasize communication and interpersonal
skills and "having a positive orientation toward employee in-
volvement." The Trainer/Coordinators were considered to be part
of the Personnel function and were co-managed, with one manager
provided by Personnel and one by the union. It was expected
that those selected to be Trainer/Coordinators would remain in
the role for two years and then would cycle back to their old
responsibilities.
As might be expected, given the loosely defined selection
criteria, the first group of Trainer/Coordinators had widely
divergent skills and backgrounds. While some were exceptionally
talented and enthusiastic, others appeared to have been given the
job because no one was quite sure what to do with them. This was
equally true of those selected by the union and those selected by
management. Some of the early union Trainer/Coordinators were
shop chairmen who had failed to get re-elected. Some of the
early manager Trainer/coordinators were either marginal perform-
ers or those who suffered from being labelled a "people person".
This range in ability ultimately meant that there was to be
considerable variability in the effectiveness of members of the
group.
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To prepare the Trainer/Coordinators for their new job,
Argona, who had been named one of the co-managers, took them to
Cornell University for an intensive training program. The
program was delivered by Peter Lazes and Ron Mitchell, a graduate
student in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cor-
nell. Subjects covered included an overview of the philosophy
and intent of a QWL program, the Problem Solving Process, qroup
dynamics and facilitation and training skills.
The early roll-out of the problem-solving qroups proceeded
rapidly. By the latter part of 1981, there were over 90 groups
in action, spread over the four main plants at the Webster
facility. As was usually the case when QWL programs were set up,
the first teams devoted a qreat deal of time to "hyqiene" issues
that directly impacted their work environment. While this was
understood as a "natural" phenomenon by Argona, the
Trainer/Coordinators and other QWL advocates, it reinforced the
fears of the sizeable number of managers and supervisors in the
organization who felt that the program was a waste of resources
and would have little bottom-line impact. The feelings of the
skeptics were perhaps best captured by one senior manager who
said, "If we are truly interested in improvement, the money we're
spending on these groups could be far better spent. Give me ten
extra industrial engineers and we'll find more ways to save costs
than you, letting the employees do it "
The Trainer/Coordinators dealt with this the only way they
could. Gradually, the groups were encouraged to focus on prob-
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/lems more directly related to the firm's production process.
Such issues as the organization of tool storage, the design of
floor layout, the elimination of toxic fumes, the design of new
tooling to improve accuracy and the design of an orientation
program for new employees were taken on by various groups. While
cost savings were not typically calculated, those closest to the
work of the teams, both supporters and skeptics alike, acknowl-
edged that the problem-solving groups were cutting into the
firm's cost base.
Managinq the OWL Implementation: Networks and Information-sharing
At the corporate level, Tragash now turned his attention to
creating awareness of employee involvement across the corpora-
tion. He began this task by calling together a group of twelve
organizational development and personnel research colleagues from
all parts of the corporation. As an incentive to attend, he
invited a well-known outside consultant, David Nadler, to address
the group. Tragash outlined for the group the direction the
corporation was taking through the QWL experiments in manufactur-
ing and asked the group to react. Additionally, he encouraged
them to explore various models for organizational change that
might be useful to Xerox in its renewal efforts and asked them,
quite pointedly, what they thought the human resources function
might do to facilitate change in Xerox.
The meeting was a great success. Participants were excited
by the discussions and the opportunity to share information and
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experiences. Tragash now had an effective tool for communicating
to the human resources community what corporate thinking and
plans were and for creating a greater sense of coherence around
the numerous change experiments being conducted across the
organization. The meeting came to be known as the Xerox Organi-
zational Effectiveness Conference and grew steadily from 12
participants in the first year, to 25 in the second year, 130 in
the third year, and finally over 400 in 1984 when it was
divisionalized as part of the quality movement. While starting
with human resource attendees, it came to include the
Trainer/Coordinators for the problem-solving teams and employees
charged with the firm's extensive benchmarking activities - in
short everyone involved in what was then called the Business
Effectiveness program. A subgroup of the participants - Argona
and the Trainer/Coordinators for the problem-solving teams -
expanded on this model and formed a network (the Organizational
Effectiveness Network) that met much more frequently to discuss
common problems, work through solutions and provide emotional
support to colleagues involved in the often times frustrating
task of facilitating behavioral change in the workplace.
Two other communication vehicles - "The Summit" and "The
Corporate Forum" - were developed during the early 1980's to
facilitate the renewal process in general and employee involve-
ment in particular. Both of these resulted from a desire to keep
alive the spirit of openness and cooperation that characterized
the 1980 contract negotiations. The Summit was a very private,
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annual meeting between the Chairman and President of Xerox and
the senior Amalgamated leadership. In it, the hard facts of
business life were discussed - in essence, Xerox opened its books
to the union.
The Corporate Forum was also an annual meeting, but its
focus was specifically the QWL program. Senior corporate execu-
tives and the top management of the Development and Manufacturing
(D&M) area met with ACTWU officials for a "progress check" on how
the company was doing with employee involvement and QWL. This
was an opportunity to both look backward, evaluate and learn and
look forward to plan for the future. Additionally, it provided
an opportunity for formally recognizing successful problem-
solving teams by having them make presentations on their work to .
the top union and management leaders. Such presentations also
helped senior managers to better understand the QWL process and
to experience its benefits, both financial and motivational, in a
tangible way.
Changinq the Culture: A Role-Model Takes Command in Development
and Manufacturinq
The implementation of the QWL effort in manufacturing and
the dissemination of the employee involvement concept to other
parts of the firm was facilitated by a change of command in the
manufacturing and technical parts of the firm. In the latter
part of the 1970's, the engineering or development side of the
firm, was headed by an executive who was a brilliant technician
with a Ph.D. from MIT. This executive was very detail-oriented
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and ran the technical side of the business with an iron fist,
characteristics that did not endear him to his subordinates or
enhance the unit's performance. As one employee in the unit at
that time put it, "Mistakes were not tolerated, which of course
meant many were made. Collaboration was basically nil. People
were only looking out for themselves. We had a product that came
out in the market called the 3300, which was a real disaster.
When it hit the market, David Kearns, the President and CEO, had
corporate audit come in and find out what the heck was going on -
why would you put such a (poor machine) out in the market?
(Among the things they found out was that) people were afraid to
send any bad news up the line, because messengers were shot and
drawn and quartered by the hour. So information was hidden that
was key to a successful program." Not surprisingly, the head of
engineering did not have high regard for team-oriented activities
or employee involvement.
In 1980, a change of management occurred when Frank Pipp
was brought in to head up the newly formed Development and
Manufacturing (D&M) organization.
Xerox from the Ford Motor Company.
Pipp had originally come to
He had a long history in
manufacturing, had run that function at Xerox, but had left the
function to take an assignment on the corporate staff.
Pipp's job, employees were subsequently to find out, was to
come in and "thaw out the culture". He informed selected employ-
ees that his successor had already been chosen and that he
expected he would only be in the job about two or two and a half
25
years. During that time, however, he fully intended to change
the way things had been done. In addition, Pipp was a very
strong supporter of employee involvement and was determined to
facilitate its growth in the firm.
Management Traininq- Back to Basics in DeveloDment and Manufac-
turinq .
On his first day on the job, Pipp called Tom Kayser, a
management training and development professional from-~he engi-
neering area to his office. He told Kayser about his desire to
change the culture and asked him to design a training program
that would re-introduce the fundamentals of management. He used
the analogy of football coach Vince Lombardi whose opening words
to his team at the start of training camp were always, "Gentle-
men, we're going back to basics. This is a football!" Pipp
said, "I don't care how much training these people have had, and
I know they've had tons of training. I want to go back to
basics."
Kayser left the meeting excited at the prospects for change
within the organization. Indeed, unbeknownst to Pipp, Kayser was
planning to take a job with Intel because of his disiLlusionment
with the organization under the previous head of engineering, but
he canceled those plans after his meeting with Pipp. With the
help of Alton Bartlett, an external consultant, Kayser quickly
designed a two-day training program called the Management Effec-
tiveness Workshop, that covered such things as how to build a
climate of mutual trust, motivation, communication and delega-
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tion. Then over a six month period, with the help of the same
consultant, he delivered it in small groups to every manager in
the Development and Manufacturing operation. The course proved
to be very well received. It had apparently struck the right
chord.
Performance Appraisal and Internal Competitiveness
Beyond its immediate impact on the skills of the Develop-
ment and Manufacturing management group, the course proved to be
an excellent vehicle for Pipp to better understand the needs of
his organization. When Pipp had announced the course, he had
made it very clear that this was to be a program for every
manager in the organization, including senior managers. He said
he planned to take the course last to get feedback from the
trainers on what they had learned from the rest of the managers.
He also said he would meet with the management group to confirm
what he had learned and discuss follow-up actions.
When Pipp and his direct reports took the course, they got
an earful about problems in the organization. It had proved to
be a wise move to have the course taught by a team composed of an
insider and an outsider. Bartlett's open demeanor and easy style
put the managers at ease and his stature as a professor allowed
him to challenge senior managers and probe for insight. Addi-
tionally, his status as an outside professional gave managers
confidence that he would actually convey their comments upward.
Kayser, on the other hand, was known for his professionalism as a
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trainer, thus lending an aura of legitimacy to the program, was
trusted and as an insider could help Bartlett to understand the
nuances of life at Xerox.
The basic message that Kayser and Bartlett conveyed was
that the managers in the organization did not feel very motivat-
ed. To a degree, this was due to the frustrations they had
experienced because of the autocratic style of management of
Pipp's predecessor. However, an additional factor that was
affecting morale was the firm's performance appraisal system.
That system required employees to be rated on a five point scale,
with the distribution of ratings in a given unit forced to fit a
pre-defined curve. Such a system, the managers argued, often
forced them to give lower ratings that did not accurately reflect
an employee's performance. Additionally, it pitted managers
against each other when they met to divide up merit increase
funds. These meetings often turned into shouting matches, with
the loudest or most articulate managers generally winners in the
battle to persuade others that their employees were better.
During times of poor organizational performance, when the merit
increase pool was smaller and the possibility of layoff was
larger, employees "would literally kill" for a higher rating.
In these times "people would withhold information from each
other, because they knew there were only so many (higher ratings)
to go around within their group, and the more information every-
body else had, the less the chance that they would stand out and
get the raise."
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Clearly the performance appraisal system was undermining the
credibility of managers in the eyes of their subordinates and was
creating a strong undercurrent of competitiveness within the
organization.
Kayser and Bartlett strongly recommended to Pipp that the
performance appraisal system be changed. They also felt that
given his concern with changing the culture, he should do some-
thing to encourage managers to use the skills and knowledge they
were being exposed to in the Management Effectiveness Workshop.
Pipp acted on their recommendations. In 1981 he commis-
sioned a task force under Tim Tyler, the manager in charge of
Compensation for D&M, to look at how the performance appraisal
system could be changed. He charged the task force with creating
a system that would address employee needs and current organiza-
tional problems and would be compatible with the QWL environment
the firm was trying to create. The task force had representa-
tives from all major personnel units in D&M, both line and staff.
Over the course of a year, the task force collected information
through literature reviews, focus interviews of employees and
discussions with other companies. Their final recommendations
argued for a complete change in the appraisal system and a
modification of the firm's compensation administration practices.
The new system had a number of key features. First, it was
to be built around an objectives setting process that tied the
various levels of the organization together through interlocking
objectives. Those at the top of the organization would define
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their objectives for the coming year. These would then cascade
downward and each successive layer would build upon the objec-
tives of the layer immediately above. At appraisal time, employ-
ees would be held accountable for the specific objectives they
had defined at the beginning of the year, using evaluative
criteria that they had also set at that time. It was hoped that
this system would significantly focus the efforts of employees to
the critical priorities of the firm and encourage employees to
support each other. This had not happened in the old "after the
fact" system, where employees simply did their job, or what they
thought was their job, and reported against it at the end of the
year.
A second feature of the new system was that it discarded
the five box rating scale, with its forced distribution. In-
stead, in a controversial decision, the task force recommended a
"no box" system in which employees' performance against objec-
tives would be evaluated in a narrative discussion. This, it was
hoped, would move employees away from a preoccupation with a
numerical rating, with its implications of classification,
invidious comparison and competition, and toward skill develop-
ment and growth in pursuit of performance objectives.
A third feature addressed employees' concern that they were
not getting sufficient jOb-related performance feedback. To fill
this need, the task force initially recommended quarterly perfor-
mance reviews. When discussions with line managers suggested
this might be too onerous, the group settled on a bi-annual
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system, with an informal interim review at mid-year and a formal,
written review at year-end.
The performance appraisal design recommendations were
accepted and it was decided to use the new system for all sala-
ried employees in D&M, both exempt and non-exempt. Thus, even
the clerical staff would be involved in the objective-setting
process. The marketing side of the firm kept the five box
system, which was felt to be more compatible with very measurable
sales and service activities.
Implementation, which began in 1983, was built around a
massive training effort. The old performance appraisal system
had been in place for twenty years and there was great concern
that without the proper training and re-socialization, the new
system would be neither understood nor properly used.
training design was based upon a cascade philosophy.
The
Personnel
trained the President and his staff. Each of those managers then
delivered the training to their managers, with the help of a
personnel resource person, and so on through all levels of the
organization. Every manager learned the system and then taught
the system.
Helpinq Managers to change: The Value of Emplovee Feedback
The second of the recommendations made to Pipp by Kayser
and Bartlett at the close of the Management Effectiveness Work-
shop concerned the changes in managerial behavior that Pipp
wanted to facilitate through that workshop. They suggested that
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managers would be much more likely to use the skills they were
being exposed to if they had a mechanism for getting feedback on
their management style from their subordinates. This would give
them the capacity to "look in the mirror" and fine-tune their
behavior.
Pipp liked the idea. He set up a small task force under
Norm Deets, Manager of Human Resources Development, that included
Tom Kayser, Sam Malone and Dick Morano, Manager of Technical
Education, to design and implement a management style survey.
Under this process, all employees were periodically surveyed
about the managerial style tendencies of their manager. Managers
also rated themselves using the same survey. These surveys were
returned to a local university, where the results were compiled.
Any manager with three or more employees was then sent a print-
out that showed the average ratings he/she was given by his/her
subordinates for each of the evaluative categories. They were
also provided with statistics that "gave (them) a feel for how
(they) stacked up against all other managers" and allowed them to
compare their own view of themselves with that of their subordi-
nates. Managers were required to meet with their subordinates to
discuss the results and to receive help in formulating personal
developmental plans. Initially, the survey results were confi-
dential to the manager, being intended as a developmental tool.
In some parts of the organization, however, they now also go to a
manager's supervisor for review and to assure corrective action
is taken.
32
QWL and the White-Collar World of Technology Development
As the problem-solving groups spread throughout the manu-
facturing complex, they also began to appear in other parts of
the Webster site. Frank Pipp had decided when he took over the
new Development and Manufacturing organization, that he wanted
the QWL program to be implemented in the engineering and technol-
ogy area, as well as manufacturing. At that time, it was becom-
ing clear the Xerox's product development efforts were mired in
bureaucratic inefficiency, something that would have to be
quickly turned around if the firm was to become more responsive
to the market. Thus, in 1981, when Pipp told his managers that
the performance appraisal system would be changed and that the
managerial styles evaluation program would be developed, he also
announced the creation of a special unit charged with bringing
QWL problem-solving groups to the development side of the organi-
zation. Tom McMullen was brought in to take over all the respon-
sibility for the QWL effort in engineering and technology.
McMullen was a brash, somewhat irreverent man, who was thoroughly
committed to the value of employee participation. He put togeth-
er a small staff that included Tom Kayser, who had enthusiasti-
cally approached him about getting involved in the QWL work, and
they set about setting up a trainer/coordinator group and helping
them to get problem-solving groups established in each unit.
The problems experienced by McMullen and his people in
starting up a QWL program in engineering were, in many respects,
a microcosm of those experienced throughout Xerox. The initial
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~reception for the program was far from warm. Some middle-manag-
ers and supervisors took it as a lack of confidence in their
abilities. others were thoroughly irritated by the time demands
it placed upon them. In the early 1980's, the development
organization was under enormous pressure to produce products that
would reassert Xerox's technological dominance and re-claim lost
market share. For many ~anagers and supervisors, the issues
being dealt with by the groups were things that a "good" employee
should have been dealing with anyway. ASking managers to learn
new tools and spend time meeting with teams was not seen as
something that would ease the manager's burden or that they
should have been doing anyway, but as an add on, an additional
draw on their time. One manager paraphrased a sentiment he often
heard expressed at this time: "...(this is) an extra burden ...
now, damn it, you want me to meet in teams and you want me to use
these damn tools, and I'm too busy. I'm just lucky if I can make
my decisions fast enough to keep up with the pace and the pres-
sure." The relatively long time it took groups to generate
solutions, as they struggled with the new techniques, did not
help to ease these managerial sentiments.
Among the actual technical staff, particularly the engi-
neers, a resistance appeared that had not been encountered in
manufacturing. The issue was professional pride. The engineer-
ing staff did not take kindly to the notion that people from the
human resources staff were going to come in and teach them
problem-solving techniques. Tom Kayser describes the situation
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graphically: "... can you imagine coming in as a staff group and
saying to an engineering group, 'we're going to teach you how to
problem solve.' (The reaction) we got, if it was laughter, that
was kindness. What we got (more often was), 'You've gotta be
full of ..... I do that for a job. What are you, as a staff
group, gonna teach me about problem solving? We don't want to
have anything to do with it." Fortunately, there were some
engineering managers who encouraged involvement and the reaction
of those lower down in the organization was quite supportive.
Frank Pipp recognized that there was resistance to the
program and tried very hard to make his support of QWL visible.
Whenever possible he spoke of its benefits and what he hoped it
could accomplish. He became a regular fixture at problem-solving
group picnics, taking charge of cooking hotdogs for the
attendees. He also made it quite clear to his direct reports
that they were expected to exhibit a similar level of commitment
to the program.
Gradually, the QWL effort began to make inroads in the non-
manufacturing areas in Webster. By the middle of 1982 there were
well over 150 problem-solving groups operating at the Webster
site.
Competitive Pressures Com~el a Re-structurina of Xerox's Work
Force
The overall implementation of what was coming to be called
El, employee involvement, was made enormously more difficult in
these early years by the arrival of the "precipice of bad re-
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suIts" feared by senior management. The first strong clues to
the weakness of Xerox's competitive position had come in the
1979-1980 time period when Frank Pipp had become concerned that
the 8 percent per year efficiency gains that Xerox typically
achieved were not adequate. He told his Vice President for
Manufacturing, Charlie Christ, to look outside the firm and see
what others were doing. Christ sent a team to Japan to examine
the internal operations of Fuji Xerox. This was the first formal
benchmarking activity undertaken by Xerox.
The team returned with shocking news. Xerox knew that the
Japanese could manufacture a copier in Japan, ship it to the
United states, and sell it three times (distributor, dealer,
retail customer) with mark-ups each time, for about the same
final price as it would cost Xerox to build it in the U.S. But
Xerox did not know how they could do this. The benchmarking team
found the reason why: Xerox was as much as 50 percent off their
competitors on traditional indicators of organizational perfor-
mance. Perhaps the most telling of these measures was the ratio
of indirect workers (all those not directly involved in the
actual manufacture of copier parts or in the final assembly of
copiers) to direct production workers. Competitors were typical-
ly operating at a ratio of .7 indirect workers to every produc-
tion worker. Xerox had about 1.6 indirect to direct laborers.
Clearly the firm had become bureaucratized and excessively top
heavy.
Xerox knew it would have to reduce the size of its indirect
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workforce significantly. In the D&M organization, where most of
the employee involvement activity was occurring, Frank Pipp set
the broad guidelines for the type of organization Xerox wanted to
become. "1 want you to take 20 percent out. I want you to
flatten the organization. I want you to increase your span of
control." Managers were asked to systematically examine their
areas of responsibility, to look for redundancy, for individuals
who did not have as much work as they should, for functions that
could be combined or eliminated, for opportunities to centralize
functions or transfer individuals. Pipp's rule was one over six
to twelve - one boss for every six to twelve employees.
The staffing cuts started in September of 1981 with a
voluntary reduction program that offered up to fifteen months
salary to those choosing to leave the firm. Thousands did, but
it was still not enough. The firm had to turn to involuntary
reductions in force and redeployments of personnel. Over the
next two years, from November, 1981 to late 1983, Xerox lowered
its worldwide workforce by almost 14,000 out of a total of
approximately 117,000. In Monroe county, where Webster is
located, almost 3000 jobs were lost (out of a total of approxi-
mately 15,500.) While the vast majority of the reductions came
at the expense of mid-level managers and white collar support
staff, the unionized manufacturing operations in Webster lost 700
jobs.
Xerox management realized that a downsizing effort of this
magnitude would have to be handled with great care, else it could
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devastate the organization. The two key issues, in this regard,
were 1) managing the context of the reduction so everyone clearly
understood the reasons for the action and 2) maintaining equity
in the reduction process. Of the two, the second was, perhaps,
the most difficult to resolve.
Maintaining equity during a reduction in force is in large
part an exercise in balancing the needs of the organization for
effectiveness against the expectations for fair treatment and
security of employees. At Xerox, the tension between these
conflicting perspectives was reflected in a debate over whether
the reduction should be accomplished largely through voluntary or
involuntary means. The protagonists in this debate were Opera-
tions and Personnel. Operations took the position that the
reduction should emphasize involuntary means. They wanted to
choose who would be let go so they could be certain that the best
employees remained with the firm. Personnel, on the other hand,
argued for the heavy use of voluntary programs to reduce the
workforce. Such methods were seen as being far more "humane" and
painless because those leaving have chosen to do so. What was
generally unspoken, but clearly believed, was that those who
stayed really wanted to because of their commitment to the
organization.
Personnel won the first round of this debate. The issue at
hand then became one of determining how to manage an effective
voluntary reduction. To John Foley, then Manufacturing Opera-
tions Vice President of Personnel at Webster, the key to success
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was "understanding where your surpluses are." This is a matter
of cataloguing the primary and secondary skills of each employee,
determining the total number of employees currently in each skill
category in the organization. In short, undertaking manpower
planning, so the opportunity to leave voluntarily could be
parcelled out in a targeted fashion to those skill categories
where the firm had an excess of talent. If this was not done,
the firm would run the risk of losing people with critical skills
who would then have to be replaced.
Much to Xerox's embarrassment, just such a situation had
occurred at the firm's Xerox Square offices in downtown Roches-
ter. Secretaries there were given the option of leaving volun-
tarily, without a careful analysis of the need for secretarial
support and the typical turnover dynamics of the secretarial
workforce. As a result, Xerox paid quite a number of secretaries
twelve to fifteen months salary in severance, and then, after six
months time, had to hire some of them back again. Thus, Person-
nel devoted a great deal of attention during this period to
developing an effective manpower planning capability.
The targeted voluntary reductions, however, were not enough
to ease the firm's indirect cost burden. The only choice was to
turn to the involuntary route. If this was to be the case,
however, the people in Personnel were determined that they were
"not going to let each manager ... willy-nilly determine how
they're going to select who gets laid off." They were worried
that favoritism might intrude into the process and it was
39
of paramount importance to Foley and his people that equity
should be maintained.
Personnel identified the two critical considerations in the
decision to let someone go as job/performance and tenure with the
firm. The fundamental issue was, "how do you trade off perfor-
mance versus tenure?"
Foley went to senior management with that question and
asked for guidance. Did they want to approach this as would be
done with a unionized labor force, with seniority determining
eligibility for lay-off? Did they want to keep the best people,
irrespective of how long they had been with the firm? What was
the proper trade-off?
The decision was made to construct a model to allow both
factors and the age of the employee to be uniformly and ratio-
nally applied to the lay-off decision. To this end, Personnel
devised a three-dimensional matrix that had tenure intervals
along one axis, performance ratings along the second axis, and
employee age intervals along the third. Performance ratings
ranged from one to five, following the rating categories still in
use in the firm's five box performance appraisal system (The
implementation of a new appraisal system, described above, did
not begin until 1983). To protect employees who had just changed
jobs, performance ratings from the last three appraisals were
averaged and that number was used to place an employee along the
performance dimension.
For Foley and Personnel, the problem was then to define
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which cells of the matrix were candidates for lay-off. Perfor-
mance was the first factor looked at. Anybody with an unsatis-
factory performance rating (one to two) no matter how long he/she
were with the firm, was "fair game" for lay-off. Likewise,
exceptional performancers (those rated five) were generally safe.
It was the employees rated either three or four on the five point
scale that had to be carefully examined. Shorter tenured,
younger employees at each performance level were more at risk
than longer-tenured, older employees. Those rated at three at a
given tenure and age level were more at risk than those rated a
four.
The most difficult decisions were those that involved long-
term, older employees who were only modest performers. Opera-
tions typically argued for letting these people qo. Foley dug in
his heels in these situations. He felt that the firm should
"give some leeway" to long service employees. He would arque,
"...this guy's been around here for 25 years and (you) tell me
he's a turkey now. Don't you tell me now he's a bad performer.
You kept him over 25 years, don't tell me he's bad today."
The matrix was finalized through an exhaustive consensus
process involving line management, corporate management and
Personnel. In addition to the base matrix, special overlays were
created to account for affirmative action concerns.
Beyond affirmative action issues, Personnel was concerned
about the impact of the reduction program on the age profile of
the firm. In such programs, it is inevitable that more younger
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/than older employees will be let go. In part, this is a function
of Federal age discrimination laws that make the layoff of older
employees a delicate matter. If Xerox was not to mortgage its
future viability by letting go those younger employees who might
grow to be significant contributors, the age profile would have
to be protected. Thus, Personnel argued that even though the
firm was laying off large numbers of people, it was important to
continue with a reasonably active college hiring program. The
hiring program should be tied to the manpower planning process.
Skills that were in short supply or skill areas that had predomi-
nantly older employees would be targets for the hiring program.
Senior management agreed, but the decision was never well under-
stood or well-received in the organization, even after a consid-
erable communication effort to explain it.
The layoffs were a very traumatic time for those Xerox
managers who survived. Despite all the planning and analysis
that went into defining who should be let go, many managers felt
that insufficient attention was paid to the actual layoff pro-
cess. Of particular concern was the need for counselling to help
managers actually carry out the reductions. One senior manager
captured this sentiment well: "...there was the overall problem
of the layoffs and how do I, as a manager, deal with that in a
practical manner? How do I actually interact with other human
beings about the fact that I have to let them go?" Personnel
provided some training to assist managers in the activity; the
prevailing sentiment, however, was that it was not enough.
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Competitive Pressures Impact 1983 Union Contract
The reduction in force was aimed at lowering the indirect
labor component of the firm's costs. As Xerox's financial
performance worsened, however, direct labor costs also came under
scrutiny. It became evident to both the company and the union
that direct labor would not remain untouched - they also would
have to feel some pain. T~e 1983 contract negotiations would
define the extent of that pain.
Xerox management recognized that this would not be easy for
the workforce to accept. The firm's sales figures were still
very impressive and were well publicized. What wasn't publicized
were the structural weaknesses that were leading to a sharp drop
in the firm's return on assets. This story needed to be shared
with the workforce, else they would never accept the wage and
benefit concessions that were expected to come out of the negoti-
ations.
Sam Malone, from Personnel in Webster, and Joseph Cahalin,
from the corporate offices, were given the task of preparing a
series of slide shows that would be used to explain the firm's
competitive position to the union workforce. Working closely
with the benchmarking people on the corporate staff, they painted
a picture that "peeled the onion" on Xerox performance. Point by
point Xerox costs were compared to comparable Japanese organiza-
tions. Everything from average employee benefit levels to direct
to indirect ratios was addressed. Great care was taken in
crafting the message and designing the visuals so as to inform
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without alienating. The message, however, pulled no punches:
"...if (Xerox) couldn't become competitive in the united states,
there were opportunities to move (the business) offshore."
The ACTWU leadership supported the effort as much as
possible. They had been shown the benchmarking studies by senior
management and could clearly appreciate the changes that would be
necessary for the business to survive. They also knew that such
things as a pay freeze and reduction in benefits would not be an
"easy sell". Thus, they reviewed the text of the presentation
and advised Malone on the best way to make certain points.
The presentations were titled, "The Choice Is Ours." There
were three of them and delivery was spread out over the course of
a year, largely in 1982. Employees were pulled off the line in
small groups of about 30 and went to the cafeteria, where a
senior manager (usually a Senior vice President) made the presen-
tat ion and answered questions. Union off'icials showed their
support by being present at the sessions. Every effort was made
to show that this was a joint effort.
The results of the 1983 contract negotiations reflected the
sober message of the presentations. The new contract "had no
wage increase in the first year, it included changes regarding
co-pay provisions for health benefits, and contained a highly
restrictive no-fault absenteeism program. (Additionally, it
allowed a temporary workforce of a limited size to be hired for a
limited duration, but at below union wage rates.) The health
benefits changes and the one-year wage freeze were seen as
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concessionary and hence resented."*
The contract, however, was ratified. Malone believes that
the presentations played a significant role in this happening.
He is also quite clear that the presentations were effective
because they came out of a joint effort, between union and
management. "And that's a tribute ... to the union's recognition
that their success is predicated on the company's success."
Victories And Difficulties In The aWL Program
All the while this downsizing was occurring, Argona,
McMullen and their Trainer/Coordinators continued to nurture the
employee involvement process. This was proving to be a frustrat-
ing enterprise. The top-down culture of Xerox, with decision
making and follow-on action driven by management, consistently
got in the way. Additionally, the very general charge to the
problem solving teams led many to spend time on projects such as
improving reward and recognition for employees or significant
facilities modifications that were unlikely to be implemented
because of policy or budgetary concerns.
After the initial enthusiasm for the program wore off, the
number of employees volunteering for the problem solving groups
began to decline. In part, this was due to employee discontent
with the layoffs that were starting to occur. More fundamental-
ly, however, the initial volunteers for the program came from
*Tracina a Transformation in Industrial Relations, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs, BLMR 123,
1988, p. 9.
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that group of employees who were quite favorably disposed to
employee involvement. By the most optimistic of estimates this
group constituted only a minority of the total workforce, perhaps
30 percent. The rest of the workforce was either skeptical about
employee involvement, and thus adopted a wait and see attitude,
or openly hostile, because of fears that it would lead to jOb
loss, a weakening of the union or poor decisions.
The Trainer/Coordinators found the opposition, distrust,
lack of cooperation and indifference very difficult to deal with.
For many of them, facilitating employee involvement was more than
just a job; it was a moral imperative. While this made them
persuasive advocates for the program, it also proved to be their
achilles heel. They believed in employee involvement and devoted
enormous physical and emotional energy to try to get those either
hostile or not cooperating to see the light. In many respects,
they and the program would have benefitted more had they devoted
more of their time to improving existing problem-solving groups
or encouraging the "fence-sitters" to get involved. By focusing
on the hard cases the Trainer/Coordinators increased their own
frustration level to the point that some simply burned out.
others got so discouraged with the lack of management coopera-
tion, that they "retreated" into their offices and took a "we'll
show you" work slow down attitude, deemed acceptable in the
prevailing union culture.
Xerox management was not content with the plateaued partic-
ipation levels. While the problem-solving groups in existence
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were having a positive impact on costs and production, greater
participation was needed if the company was to turn around.
After some analysis, it was decided that part of the problem was
that many employees did not have a sufficient understanding of
the QWL process and the benefits it would bring to both company
and employees. Manufacturing Operations decided to address this
issue by making QWL training mandatory for all employees. This
proved to be counterproductive. While some employees who had
been sitting on the fence now got involved, the majority simply
went through the motions while in training and still did not
become active participants in the process.
The polarization of the workforce around the value of QWL
activities did not mean that the program was not having an impact
on the performance of the organization. In fact, the participat- .
ive activities had some remarkable successes. Perhaps the most
noteworthy of these involved a special study team put together in
late 1981 to address a company proposal to outsource the assembly
of wire harnesses used in Xerox copiers. As this has been
described in detail elsewhere* , we will only summarize the key
activities.
The Xerox proposal to subcontract the assembly of wire
harnesses was predicated on an internal study that suggested that
over $3 million could be saved by such action because of the
labor intensive nature of the work. If this was done, however,
*Klingel S. and A. Martin (Eds.), A Fiahtina Chance.
ILR Press, 1988.
Ithaca, New York:
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it was highly likely that 180 workers - an entire department -
would be laid off. This was unacceptable to the union and the
union leadership asked to meet with management over the issue.
In those discussions, the General Shop Chairman of the union,
Anthony Costanza, argued that an action of this magnitude, that
affected the lives of so many workers, should not be made unilat-
erally but should be dealt with in a way that was consistent with
the joint decision making principles agreed to in the~980 con-
tract negotiations.
The company agreed and temporarily suspended the outsourc-
ing activities. A joint study team was established to examine
the issue in detail and make recommendations. The team was
composed of six~arefully selected employees from the wire
harness department, an engineer to act as a technical resource,
and a manager. The team was given six months to "find ways to be
competitive, improve quality, cost, and delivery performance of
the business to levels which will assure a positive competitive
position and, ultimately to secure jObs."*
After receiving training in problem solving, group dynam-
ics, and Xerox's internal accounting methods, the team turned to
the task. They were assisted in their analysis by Peter Lazes,
the consultant who had been supporting the QWL activities.
Many roadblocks to success appeared along the way. The
team had to learn to work together as a team and not be driven by
*Tracina a Transformation in Industrial Relations, u.s. Dept. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs, BLMR 123,
1988, p. 9.
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its manager and engineer members. It had to overcome organiza-
tional resistance to providing confidential information to such a
grass roots group. It had to gain the trust of the hourly labor
force by involving them in the analysis as much as possible.
had to meet the rigorous benchmarking standards set by the
It
corporation.
The team succeeded in addressing all of these issues. And
when it completed its report, it proposed changes that appeared
to more than meet the financial savings requirements. Noteworthy
among their recommendations were several that went against
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The team made a presentation to David Kearns, the President
and CEO of Xerox, and other senior executives. John FOley, the
Vice President of Personnel in Manufacturing Operations, de-
scribes the impact of the presentation this way: "To see an
hourly production worker who five years ago, very frankly,
although we never said it, was treated (as though he should)
bring (his) hands and leave (his) brains at home... we had an
army of industrial engineers telling them exactly what to do...
to see these people coming in and talking about ROI's and... too
much overhead; talking about how we don't need all those engi-
neers to support us; that we don't need inspectors, (because we
can) inspect our own work. (You could see they had) a tremendous
commitment to changing the business ... You have to feel and
touch that to really see the power of employee involvement."
Kearns was impressed.
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/To check on the accuracy of the study team's analysis,
Frank pipp asked Norm Rickard and his benchmarking people to
examine it. They found some small flaws that brought the total
projected savings to less than the $3 million needed. More
important, however, the proposals that contravened the union
contract could not be implemented until they were renegotiated
when the next contract talks came up. That would be in 1983.
The management of the wire harness area was inclined not to
accept the team's recommendations because they were now several
hundred thousand dollars short of the target; to essentially say
to the team, "You failed. You missed by two tenths."
Hal Tragash, the corporate Manager for Organizational
Effectiveness, had been at the presentation by the team. When he
heard that its proposals might be rejected, he went to David
Kearns and privately informed him. He also suggested to him that
"You better tell him (the wire harness manager) that for two
tenths, he buys the decision or you've lost employee involvement
forever." Kearns intervened and the non-contract-related propos-
als were implemented.
Serendipitously, Tragash used the wire harness study to
develop a coalition at the corporate level between himself and
Norm Rickard, the head of the benchmarking group. Seeing
Rickard's role in the potential rejection of the study team's
proposals, Tragash confronted Rickard. "...we seem to be here on
two different missions. You seem to be a person that's bringing
problems for people to work on or challenging them with problems.
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I seem to be a person bringing tools for sOlving problems. What
if we were to become partners in this and work together, (bring-
ing your) benchmarking information together with our problem
solving information. (Thus,) instead of benchmarking (data
being) owned by the staff and the experts, (it could become a)
part of everyday life for people... So that we (can) have meaty
problem-solving going on around your main business issues."
Rickard agreed and a partnership between the benchmarking
staff and the organizational effectiveness staff was cemented.
It was, however, a distinctly high level staff partnership. Deep
in the organization there was considerable "vagueness" about the
relationship between the two functions. One was seen as existing
"to make life better." The other, "to make business better."
That vagueness often led to conflict. But the staff partnership
between the functions later played a key role in developing the
firm's Total Quality program.
aWL Moves Into Marketinq And Service: The Value of Celebratinq
Success
Up to this time - early 1983 - the QWL program had been
established in Manufacturing and in Development. Noteworthy in
its absence from the program, however, was the Marketing side of
the firm. Except for some early experiments with service teams,
the part of Xerox that contained the largest number of employees
showed little interest in QWL activities. This was shortly to
change.
In mid-1983, Tom McMullen, who headed up QWL activities in
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the Development side of the firm, met with Tom Kayser from his
staff and Larry Pace, who worked for Nick Argona in Manufactur-
ing. They were discussing the progress of the QWL program to
date and speculating about how they could help the program to
take off. Kayser describes the key event of that discussion this
way: "We were sitting in Tom McMullen's office and McMullen
said, 'We gotta do something to celebrate the good things that
are going on, that people lower in the organization are.doing in
terms of saving the company money and doing some worthwhile
things that middle and senior management don't know anything
about - or ignore or don't care about. We (need) to have some
way of celebrating teamwork.'" Pace and Kayser agreed and the
group brainstormed on how best to accomplish the goal.
From that conversation, Xerox Teamwork Day was born.
Teamwork Day was meant to address the need for recognition and
reward in the QWL program. The format was quite straightforward.
Problem-solving groups that had either successfully completed a
task or had reached significant milestones in a task would come
together and "display their wares" to senior management. By
providing a forum for high level accolades to be given, pride in
accomplishment would be reinforced and an incentive to partici-
pate in the QWL activities would be created.
The first Teamwork Day was held in October of 1983, in the
cafeteria of the Development area. Approximately 40 problem-
sOlving groups from the Development area set up "slip-shod"
booths to tell their story. Expense was minimal, but enthusiasm
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was high.
Hal Tragash took on the task of getting the Chairman and
the President to come and preparing speeches and the schedule.
He also devoted considerable energy to see to it that Marketing
peopl~ came, "so they could see this concretely in action."
others "strong-armed" the senior staff in D&M.
Teamwork Day was an immediate hit. The senior executives
spent time interacting with the groups and hearing firsthand what
they had been doing. The enthusiasm and sincerity of the prob-
lem-solving groups impressed them. So did their accomplishments.
In 1984, the Manufacturing area got heavily involved in
Teamwork Day and the number of groups participating shot up.
This was noticed in Marketing and given the natural "competitive-
ness" of the area, they vowed to be a part of the program in
1985. By 1987, Teamwork Day had grown to an event of such
magnitude that it had to be held in the Riverside Convention
Center in downtown Rochester. Tragash describes what had hap-
pened: "Thus, an event first meant to be a recognition and
reward activity, sponsored by a Human Resources guy, became a
sales vehicle for us to drive the strategy beyond the walls of
the concrete world of manufacturing, research and engineering and
out into the field as well."
53
A strategic Vision Beqins To Take Shape
While all this was happening down in the trenches, Tragash
and Argona were also at work at the strategic level. Their
research had suggested that QWL activities were not powerful
enough to get Xerox where it ultimately wanted to go. As Argona
said, these activities were merely a convenient and effective
"process entry"~.useful to sensitize everyone to the operating
needs and performance possibilities of employee involvement.
At the behest of senior management, Tragash and Argona put
together a "vision" of how the organization should evolve. In
their view, if Xerox was to continue to improve, the organization
had to move "beyond joint problem-solving and (become a) full-
fledged, de-layered,. highly self-empowered (organization)," that
minimized hierarchy. This would involve a development process
that helped employees to evolve from being "citizens of their
work, to citizens of their work teams, to citizens of their
business unit team, to citizens of the global business." All in
all, a very significant transformation of consciousness, that
would require changes in organizational structures, training
programs, and reward system if it was to be accomplished.
A second "thought piece" produced by Tragash that had an
impact on senior management concerned the issue of quality. In
the early 1980's, shortly after Fuji Xerox had won the Deming
Prize for quality, there was a great deal of discussion about
quality in the senior ranks of Xerox. David Kearns was particu-
larly interested in its possibilities. Noticing this, Tragash
54
and Norm Rickard, who was involved with the Business Effective-
ness group, asked Kearns if he would like a plan that identified
"what it would take to, figuratively if not literally, (win a
Deming Prize) in the united states." Kearns was very interested.
He sent Tragash and Rickard off with the task to develop, within
10 days, a blueprint for becoming a total quality company.
Rickard and Tragash set to the task, assisted by Paula
Fleming from Tragash's staff and John Kelsch from the Competitive
Benchmarking group. From the Fuji Xerox experience, they
recognized quickly that they "were as much in a people, behavior
change business as (they) were in a quality tools business...
(that) if anything, it was more culture change than it was
quality tools." With that in mind, they devised a strategy,
building upon current employee involvement and benchmarking
activities. Noteworthy in their approach was the notion of the
Human Resources function as a "sub-contractor of supportive
policies and practices... It would sub-contract training; it
would be the supplier of reward system changes, it would be the
supplier of changes to the recognition and promotion systems, and
(would develop the) communications (practices)." Their report,
when delivered to Kearns, would significantly influence his
thinking on quality.
By the latter part of 1982, the various strands of thinking
and experience were beginning to come together at the corporate
level to form Xerox's commitment to quality as a vehicle for
organizational renewal. The Fuji Xerox experience provided a
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powerful and accessible model of corporate improvement, with
quality as its core. The grass roots experience of employee
involvement and group-centered problem solving in the Manufactur-
ing and Development organizations showed the potential for
increasing organizational effectiveness that lay untapped in the
non-managerial workforce. The elemental intransigence of Xerox's
managerial culturp to the need for change and to participatory
methods for improvement, suggested that a voluntary strategy for
renewal might take a great deal of time. And the simple demo-
graphics of the workforce, with the vast majority of the firm's
employees in non-manufacturing and non-engineering positions,
generally untouched by employee involvement activities, suggested
the need for a comprehensive change program.
The Qualitv Strateqy Is Developed
In September of 1982, the Xerox Corporate Management
Committee approved total quality as the guiding business princi-
ple of the firm. Several months later, in early 1983, David
Kearns met with the top 25 Xerox senior managers to discuss the
firm's competitive position, to put forth the notion that a total
quality program was to be the method for improving the firm's
performance, and to discuss the basic elements of such a program.
After two days of discussions, consensus was reached on the broad
outlines of the quality program and a title was given to it:
Leadership Through Quality.
Leadership Through Quality was not an "off-the-shelf"
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quality program that was transplanted into Xerox. It was a
program that took account of Xerox's culture, philosophy, and
business products and opportunities. Quality, as defined in the
Xerox Quality Policy presented earlier in this report, was
different than the "conventional" notion of quality in several
ways. First, quality was not defined as "goodness" or "luxury",
but as "conformance" to customer requirements. Second, Leader-
ship Through Quality emphasized the prevention of errors in
production or delivery of a product, not the post-hoc inspection
of products for defects. Third, Xerox emphasized "error-free
output in meeting customer requirements", not some prescribed
allowable level of defects. And finally, Xerox measured quality
not through indices, but by the "costs incurred when customer
requirements are not satisfied."
Two special task forces were commissioned to design the
actual quality strategy. The lead group, called the Quality
Implementation Team, had fifteen members and was responsible for
the detailed implementation strategy. It was a high-level,
international group, with members nominated by most of the major
business units of the firm. The composition of the team was
purposely made very diverse, so that from "day one in the design
process...the issues of the operating companies get addressed and
there is ownership of the process before we begin to roll it out
and somebody has a hiccough." Several of the senior corporate
officers who had been in the original design meeting with Kearns,
attended the Implementation Team's meetings as ad hoc members.
57
Noteworthy in their absence from the Implementation Team was the
ACTWU. When the team was being formed, Tragash had suggested to
David Kearns that he ought to include Tony Costanza, the union's
General Shop Chairman. Kearns demurred. The Xerox senior
management team would come to regret that decision when the
implementation began.
The Quality Implementation Team was supported by the
Quality Training Task Force. This ten person group was formed in
recognition of the comprehensive educational effort that would be
required to bring about the cultural transformation of the firm.
As with the Implementation Team, the Training group had an
international membership. Both task forces were assisted in
their work by outside consultants, particularly David Nadler and
the Delta Consulting Group which helped the Xerox senior manage-
ment group and the task forces to develop a conceptual model of a
major organizational transition.
For the next six months, the two task forces worked on
their respective problems. This was a very intense time for team
members. The work was being done at the corporate offices in
Stamford, Connecticut. On weekends team members would fly home
and then return early on Monday.
Commuting to Stamford was not the only thing that made this
a difficult time for task force members. Getting their arms
around the task also caused frustration, particularly, in the
Training Task Force. This group was dependent on the Implementa-
tion Team for the strategy defining how a total quality environ-
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ment would be created in Xerox. It was then to provide training
designs to support that strategy. Unfortunately, the Implementa-
tion Team was having difficulty deciding how it wanted to pro-
ceed. This lack of strategic direction was very frustrating to
Training Task Force members: "Why don't they decide what they
want, so we can develop the training program to support it?" It
was clear that the Implementation Team was "struggling to frame
what it was they wanted in terms that you can design a learning
program around."
After some months of this frustration, the Training group
began to take matters into its own hands. It started to devise
training approaches and send them "up" to the Implementation Team
for review. In essence, the training group began to shape
strategy in a bottom-up fashion. As Russ Chappell, who worked on
the training proposals said, "...subsequent experience has caused
me to realize that this is probably more typical than atypical."
It worked largely because 1) the overall framework for the
meaning of quality at Xerox had been very well defined by the
senior executive group, working with outside consultants, and 2)
everyone realized the firm was involved in designing a massive
cultural shift. The fact that it worked, however, did not make
it any the less taxing for the actual players.
The strategy that was ultimately devised was built around a
nine-step Quality Improvement Process (QIP). The steps were
subdivided into three phases: 1) planning for quality; 2)
organizing for quality; and 3) monitoring for quality. The
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/planning phase involved (1) a clear identification of what a
group/unit/function within the firm produced and (2) the internal
or external customer for that output; (3) a delineation of the
needs/requirements of the customer; and (4) the transformation of
those requirements into a set of detailed supplier specifica-
tions. Once this had been accomplished, the organizing phase
would begin. Here, the task was to (5) layout a detailed plan
of the work that must be done to meet the customer's require-
ments, including resources needed, budgets, timing of activities,
allocation of responsibilities and authorities; (6) select a set
of measurements and checkpoints for the critical steps in the
work process, so as to facilitate control of the process; and (7)
-determine the capability of the selected work process to deliver
the expected outcome using, where necessary, the six-step Problem
Solving Process developed earlier for the QWL activities.
Finally, in the monitoring phase, (8) the results of the work
process would be evaluated and if process improvements were found
to be necessary (9) the whole Quality Improvement Process would
be repeated, to assure continuous improvement. It was expected
that early in the implementation of Leadership Through Quality,
the Quality Improvement Process would be used by operating units
to more closely align their mission and day-to-day activities
with the needs of their customers. Once that was accomplished,
it would be continuously reapplied, together with the Problem
Solving Process, to insure the best possible organizational
performance.
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The evaluative context for the Quality Improvement Process
was to be provided by Xerox's competitive benchmarking program.
Given the ever changing nature of the competitive marketplace,
Xerox took the position that the adequacy of its performance was
a constantly moving target. In all of its activities, Xerox
desired to be at least as good as the best practices found in
.
industry. Thus, all units were required to periodically scan the
environment to determine how their functions were being accom-
plished by others and to then apply the Quality Improvement and
Problem-Solving Processes to meet the benchmarked standards.
The process of organizational improvement was clearly
defined as group-centered. The Implementation Team believed that
solutions that came out of a rigorous group analysis-by those
closest to the problem would be more effective and innovative
than those coming from a single person. The quality strategy,
therefore, clearly affirmed employee participation as a fundamen-
tal component of Leadership Through Quality. It also defined an
array of statistical tools (histograms, pareto charts, fishbone
diagrams, control charts) that were to be used by the groups to
identify problems and "un-bundle" them into their constituent
parts.
Creatinq A Culture Of Qualitv
The Quality Improvement Process, benchmarking and employee
involvement were the components of the Leadership Through Quality
strategy that dealt with the actual process of quality improve-
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mente The design task forces and their senior management clients
recognized that their strategy also had to address the issue of
buy-in. Instilling a quality orientation in all employees and
insuring that the various processes and analytical techniques
were used by all, would required a rigorous acculturation pro-
gram, else Leadership Through Quality would be treated as simply
another "program of the month." The Implementation Team identi-
fied four major elements to this acculturation program: train-
ing, communication, reward and recognition and senior management
role modelling.
Training was to be the mechanism by which Xerox employees
developed the knowledge and skills to improve the quality of
their outputs. Early in the design process, it was decided that
all employees would be required to undergo training in the basics
of Xerox's quality improvement effort. Training would not be
voluntary. Additionally, to reinforce the group-centered nature
of Leadership Through Quality, all training was to be conducted
in "family groups" composed of a manager and his/her direct
reports.
Perhaps the most noteworthy element to LTQ training,
however, was the notion that it would start at the very top of
the organization and then cascade downward through successive
levels until all had been trained. The mechanism for this was a
technique known as LUTI: Learn-Use-Teach-Inspect.
The mechanics of LUTI were deceptively simple. A manager
in a given area would undergo training in the core modules of LTQ
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(Orientation to the need for quality at Xerox and to the basics
of LTQ; Quality Improvement and Problem Solving Processes, basic
statistical tools, and managing quality skills; specialized
technical skills, where necessary) with his family group. The
training would be jointly delivered by his/her boss (the manager
in charge of the family group) and a professional trainer.
the training was complete, the family group would select a
When
problem confronting the unit and would apply the quality improve-
ment principles to resolve it. During this process, the group
would be coached by its manager. Upon completion of the work,
the family group manager would inspect the output of the group's
work, and debrief the group on both process and substantive
issues. Theoretically, members of the family group would now be
proficient in the Quality Improvement Process. Members of the
family group would then go into their own units and teach their
subordinates the principles, again with the help of a trainer.
They would oversee the application of those principles to a real
problem needing improvement and inspect the output, and so on,
down through the organization. A strict rule was that all steps
(Learn-Use-Teach-Inspect) must be satisfactorily completed,
before the training could cascade downward to the next level.
The LUTI technique was employed litokeep accountability
focused in the line. II The training design group knew that the
impact of conventional training degrades quickly. Russ
Chappell, a training professional in the U.S. Marketing Group,
put this well. "Unless...there is application and practice,
63
there won't be any real change. If there is to be real and
continuing application, it needs to be built into the management
review-planning-direction process..." LUTI would force managers
to undergo the training twice, once as student and again as
trainer, and would then encourage internalization through the use
and inspect steps of the process. It also clearly gave the
mesaage that concern for quality was a central part of the
managerial role.
The communication component of Leadership Through Quality
was based on the simple premise that "formal communications will
not succeed if they are at odds with our behavior.". The Imple-
mentation Team believed that the message that Xerox "was a
quality company" had to be repeated over and over, without frills
or slogans, as had often been done in the past with productivity
campaigns. Sincerity and consistency were to be the hallmarks of
all communications.
A key element to this approach was the recognition that
"Xerox managers at all levels are themselves powerful communica-
tions media. Consequently, all training for managers in support
of Leadership Through Quality will contain a segment on communi-
cations, including techniques for sOliciting feedback, ensuring
understanding and facilitating two-way communications.". As the
primary engine of quality improvement was to be problem solving
by employees, the communications strategy placed great emphasis
*Xerox Greenbook, Internal strategy Document For Leadership Through
Quality, August, 1983.
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on management's responsibility to facilitate the flow of informa-
tion upward, about concerns, questions and needs, and downward,
about performance expectations and data necessary for effective
problem-solving. In all communications, realism was to be
emphasized.
Recognition and reward was dealt with explicitly in the
Leadership Through Quality strategy, in part because of the
lessons learned in the earlier QWL program. In that effort, the
major inducement for employees to participate in problem-solving'
activities was the benefit they would gain from improving their
working situation- an intrinsic reward. This meant that the
program was generally appealing only to those for whom such
rewards were important. Employees seeking monetary rewards for
their problem solving activities were forced, under the QWL
program, to pervert the firm's suggestion systems. These systems
had been designed to reward non-salaried individual performers.
In the QWL program, it was not uncommon for groups to put in
their suggestions and, if they were accepted, to split the reward
among group members, including the managerial or professional
members. There were no monetary (extrinsic) inducements for
managers or supervisors to cooperate with the grass roots prob-
lem-solving activities or, indeed, to go out of their way to
recognize employee contributions as a result of participation in
the QWL program.
Leadership Through Quality confronted the issue of manage-
rial cooperation and support head on. Managers were told that
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they would be held accountable for recognizing groups or individ-
uals immediately for positive actions taken in pursuit of Xerox's
quality goals. This also meant recognizing managerial peers or
subordinates who were committed to the LUTI process and, thus,
facilitated the quality performance of others. The Leadership
Through Quality strategy mandated changes in the "Management
Resource Planning" process, the firm's managerial succession
planning system, to reflect commitment to and expertise in the
use of the Quality Improvement Process. Promotion would only
occur if such commitment and expertise had been shown. Likewise,
the performance appraisal systems in use in the firm were to be
examined for compatibility with LTQ and the actual appraisal
. discussion was separated by a period of no less than three months
from the annual salary review process, so that individual perfor-
mance could be discussed in a more developmental climate, not one
dominated by concern over money. Finally, the strategy recom-
mended the creation of special bonus systems to ensure a sharing
of the financial benefits that would accrue to the corporation as
a result of improvements in the firm's market competitiveness.
Perhaps the most powerful statement in the implementation
strategy that Leadership Through Quality was about cultural
transformation was the emphasis placed on senior management
behavior. The Implementation Team recognized that employees
throughout the organization took their cues about what was
important in Xerox from senior management. In this regard,
behavior was far more influential than words. However, just as
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the senior managers were the most powerful influence on the
culture, they were also the product of that culture. If cultural
transformation was to occur, the senior team would have to move
away from this cultural programming and behave differently. This
was not merely a matter of learning new skills and ways of
handling day-to-day matters, it involved giving up old ways of
doing things. The Implementation Team was quite explicit that
this should not be left to happenstance. A set of guidelines was
developed to help managers define what it meant to be a role
model supporter of Leadership Through Quality. These specified
what managers should do to support competitive benchmarking and
employee involvement, how they should use the Quality Improvement
Process, how they should sponsor feedback activities and foster
teamwork at all levels of the organization, and how they should
promote, recognize and reward employees who practiced Leadership
Through Quality. If these were followed, it was hoped the senior
management team's unconscious work style would evolve toward
compatibility with the needs of Leadership Through Quality and
they would, thus, "make the corporation's transition to a total
quality company happen, let it happen and help it happen."
In August of 1983, the Quality Implementation Team met with
their twenty-five senior management clients at the Xerox training
center in Leesburg, Virginia. The Leadership Through Quality
implementation strategy was presented to the group and each
manager was given the opportunity to propose modifications. The
unspoken theme for this session was buy-in. senior managers were
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given the opportunity to make changes so that they could put
their "finger print" on the strategy - could point to the exact
words they had contributed. Through such action, it was hoped
the commitment to implement would be reinforced.
The strategy and a five-year implementation plan was
codified in a ninety-two page book that was issued shortly after
the Leesburg meeting. Bound in light green covers, "'rheGreen
Book" became the bible for quality at Xerox. It was referred to
constantly by senior management and often quoted to rationalize
actions taken. with time, it developed a totemic aura in the
firm. Managers gauged their relative importance by whether they
had their own copy.
The book was important as much for what went into creating
it, as what it said. In the heyday of Xerox's rapid growth, the
firm developed a penchant for rapid action. Managers were
evaluated on their proactivity, their propensity to take action.
The Green Book was a significant departure from this "ready,
fire, aim" mentality. It grew out of a year-long process of
careful self-analysis and long-term, strategic thinking. That
alone conveyed the message that Leadership Through Quality was
different from other programs.
John Foley, the Vice President of Personnel in Manufactur-
ing operations, captures well what Leadership Through Quality was
all about. "Leadership Through Quality...was a process to change
the whole attitude and head-set of each and every employee and
give them a sense of commitment to the organization; a (feeling)
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that (they) have to improve everything that's done in this
organization...to
...treat Xerox's costs the way (they) treat their own private
checking account when (they) spend money...It's a style change
(to facilitate) people's getting involved. (Our) people always
wanted to be involved. Employee involvement is a misnomer; it
really should be management involvement. The employees always
wanted to get involved, but weren't allowed to. The managers had
to allow them to get involved. This was very threatening to
managers, because they felt they were losing control."
This theme was echoed by a manager in the Marketing area
who was a central player in the implementation of both employee
involvement and quality in that group. In designing Leadership
Through Quality, the Implementation Team was "mindful of...what
employee involvement would do to change the culture (in Market-
ing), which was truly not much. What it did was create another
activity (for the workforce), but there was no evidence of any
significant management shift in behavior or attitude. (There
was) a kind of indulgence to employee involvement and the hope
that it would produce some useful benefits, and yet with a
limited amount of commitment to the proposition that it
would (Leadership Through Quality) truly was a rescue opera-
tion (for the QWL program in Marketing)." While such strong
sentiments would not generally be found in Development and
Manufacturing, where the QWL activities made significant contri-
butions to corporate performance, they are clearly reflective of
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the difficulties confronted by Xerox when implementing the QWL
program in Marketing.
The Leadership Throuqh Qualitv Implementation Begins
To oversee Leadership Through Quality, Xerox created a new
hierarchy of positions. A Corporate Vice President for Quality
had overall responsibility for the firm's Quality efforts.
Operating units, likewise, each appointed Vice Presidents for
Quality. To drive the strategy at the nuts and bolts level, each
VP for Quality named one or more Quality Specialists. These were
middle to lower-middle managers who were charged with organizing
the LTQ training and assuring its consistent application to the
unit's output. As with the first Trainer/Coordinators in the QWL
program, the first group of Quality Specialists "was a mixed
bag." Some were handpicked. others "were between jobs and it
was convenient for them to take the jOb." only a few had any
knowledge of training skills, organizational change techniques or
group facilitation skills. The training program was designed to
be delivered over a six day period. The first day involved a set
of activities to build team consciousness in a family-group.
This was followed by five days dealing with the Problem Solving
Process, interactive skills and the Quality Improvement Process.
Early in 1984, the Quality Specialists and QWL
Trainer/coordinators (now called Organizational Effectiveness
Specialists or facilitators) were taught the entire Leadership
Through Quality training program at the Leesburg training center.
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The actual launch of Leadership Through Quality training began in
April of.1984, starting with the senior staff of the Development
and Manufacturing Group. The start-up of Leadership Through
Quality in D&M was generally characteristic of what went on in
the rest of the firm. However, because D&M began the program six
months ahead of all other Xerox divisions, it confronted all the
implementation barriers first and, thus, was forced to devise
ways of overcoming the barriers on an intensely reactive basis.
Tom Kayser, now manager of D&M Organizational Effectiveness,
explains this situation graphically. "It was like we were on the
leading edge of a black hole. We were confronting the unknown on
a daily basis. We were involved in this massive organizational
change, armed with the Green Book strategy and some tools,
marching relentlessly onward, but never really knowing what
tomorrow would bring. Development and Manufacturing took on the
role of LTQ pioneers for the rest of Xerox. It was a wonderfully
exciting time."
At the time of the launch, Development and Manufacturing
was headed by Wayland Hicks, who had taken over for Frank pipp in
1983. Hicks wanted to start the cascade as soon as the training
of Quality Specialists was completed. However, few of the
Quality Specialists in D&M were particularly expert as trainers
and none really had sufficient command of all the modules to take
on the task of training Hicks and his direct reports.
Tom Kayser stepped into the breach. Kayser had attended
the Leesburg training sessions, even though he was not formally
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/in the Quality organization. As an experienced management
trainer and master facilitator, he had a thorough command of the
interactive skills and Problem solving Process modules. He
needed only to study the Quality Improvement Process. Thus, he
volunteered to train Hicks and his family group. He was assisted
by train~rs/designers from the corporate staff who had put the
program together, but had never seen it delivered to a management
team. Using hand written materials which they modified as they
went, they trained Hicks' group and fine-tuned the modules.
Upon completion of the training, Hicks' family group had to
select a real project that they could work on together, applying
the tools learned in training to facilitate its solution. This
they did. However, in a very proactive organization, seeking
improvement in its bottomline, patience is not generally found in
abundance. Hicks pushed very hard to get the project over with,
so that the training could be cascaded downward. This was to be
a relatively common occurrence in the Quality training: manage-
rial urgency for results undercutting the effectiveness of the
LUTI process.
ed.
By now a group of trainers for the program had been select-
Some of this group were managers who wanted to get involved
in the program; some were personnel staffers who had some train-
ing background and wanted to return to that work; and still
others were drawn from non-training personnel functions. Kayser
took on the task of training the best of this group to deliver
the Leadership Through Quality program. He used his own training
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niques. At times, he turned parts of the Network meetings into a
laboratory where new processes and skills could be practiced.
Kayser and his boss, Tom McMullen, saw no inconsistency in this
sessions with a number of the family groups of Hick's direct
reports as a laboratory for how the training should be done.
Once this group of "trainers-to-be" had finished its training,
the members trained the other trainers.
Beyond actually delivering the training to the first two
levels of family groups in D&M and training the trainers for the
program, Kayser also worked with the Quality Specialists on
organizational development and facilitation skills. When Leader-
ship Through Quality was announced, victor Muth was named Quality
Vice President for the D&M organization. One of Muth's first
actions, after selecting the Quality Specialists, was to set up a
Quality Network to both plan and control the Leadership Through
Quality implementation. Network meetings were held every two
weeks, for a whole day. At these meetings, Quality Specialists
discussed aspects of the implementation and shared information
and experiences. Kayser was asked to join the Network, "not as
a Quality Specialist, but as a facilitator." He contributed to
the content of the discussions but, more important, he began to
teach the Quality Specialists about organizational development,
facilitation skills and organizational change tools and tech-
action. They were charged with developing employee involvement
activities in D&M and employee involvement was an integral part
of Leadership Through Quality. To them the two activities became
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closely intertwined and mutually beneficial.
The same could not be said for many of their colleagues who
were supporters of QWL activities. Almost from the day it was
announced, Leadership Through Quality was seen by many of these
people as a threat to employee involvement. The union was very
upset that Leadership Through Quality - a major corporate initia-
tive - had been developed without its involvement. This seemed
totally contrary to the spirit of the 1980 and 1983 contract
negotiations that had emphasized collaboration between the union
and the firm. A salient fear often heard in the first years of
Leadership Through Quality was that the program was management's
attempt to disenfranchise the union and the workers, to manage
its business in a way that minimized union involvement.
Perhaps those most captured by this fear were the QWL
Trainer/Coordinators who were now called Organizational Effec-
tiveness Specialists. Many of the Xerox employees who were drawn
to this role, both managers and union members, had strongly held
beliefs about the value of participative activities. For them,
employee participation was a fundamental moral imperative. They
were appalled at the prospect of a "top-down" change effort that
apparently gave no role to the union, and, in their eyes, only
recognized the "grass roots" QWL program by appropriating some of
the techniques and methods used by that program. Many equated
the lack of union participation in the design of Leadership
Through Quality and in its early implementation as indicating a
lack of commitment to true employee empowerment. If Leadership
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Through Quality was a customer focused program, how, they rea-
soned, could senior management ignore one of its key customers:
the union?
Concern over union involvement in Leadership Through
Quality came to a head over the LTQ training. Two issues were
important: 1) Who would design and deliver the training? and 2)
Would the training be mandatory for all employees?
With regard to the first of these, the Leadership Through
Quality training had been largely designed by the Quality Train-
ing Task Force. The union had not been a part of this group and
was concerned that it should have a say in the content of any
training received by its members. Recognizing the seriousness of
the union's concern, Xerox management agreed to create a steering
committee in D&M composed of union officials, senior managers,
Quality trainers and Organizational Effectiveness Specialists.
Its job was to integrate the union into the training process.
The solution involved a modification of the cascade process.
Union officials were included in the senior management training
sessions in Manufacturing. Additionally, Organizational Effec-
tiveness Specialists assisted the Quality trainers in the
delivery of all Leadership Through Quality training in the
manufacturing side of the firm.
While Xerox compromised on the union's involvement in the
LTQ training, the firm stood its ground on the issue of whether
the training was to be mandatory for all employees. The union
opposed mandatory training, largely on the grounds that "you
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be mandatory and that this training was no different than the
product training that occurred when a new product was introduced.
In those situations, there are "new tools to be used" and "hourly
"
can't legislate participation" and such a position would compro-
mise the union's independent status. Xerox argued that it had to
people who are going to work on (the new production) line are
given training for how to work on that line, how to use th~ new
tools..." This training is required and everyone recognized that
it should be so. In the new production environment that Xerox
was trying to create, "problem solving techniques and team skills
are tools...intellectual tools perhaps, but...if (employees are)
going to work in this environment, (they) need those tools, (the
-firm) has to train employees to use those tools, and that train-
ing should be mandatory." After a considerable amount of discus-
sion, the union bought into the argument.
The Impact of LTO On The Manaqerial Role Becomes Evident
As the LTQ training cascade progressed in D&M, a new and
unexpected problem arose: managers did not understand what it
The problem first came to lightmeant to be a facilitator.
during one of the Quality Network meetings. A group of Quality
Specialists came to Tom Kayser and said,
"God help us! Our managers don't have the foggiest
idea how to be a facilitator of their family group
when they're working these quality improvement
projects. They do one of two things: They drive
the project like they do everything else, auto-
cratically - 'We're gonna get this goddamned thing
done in three weeks; here's the schedule and here's
how we're gonna do it. You do this and you do that,
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you report to me and bang, we're gonna get this
thing over with.' Or they felt that facilitation
meant that you couldn't get involved..that, as a
manager, you couldn't open your mouth and say
anything because you would be influencing them. So
they (became) laissez-faire (managers)...The ones
that were being driven, totally lost all faith in
the tools and processes and said, 'This is no
different than it has been around here for twenty
years. What's new?.. (this is just) the ice cream
flavor of the month, because that philosophy we
talked about in the classroom sure isn't happening
here? (On the other hand,) the groups that weren't
getting any direction (from their managers) were
just spinning their wheels. (They said,) 'None of
this stuff works...we're killing ourselves with the
time we're spending in these meetings trying to
utilize these tools.'"
Kayser offered to write a short pamphlet that explained the
high points of facilitation. As he got into the project, howev-
er, he realized that there was a great deal that needed to be
said if he was to truly help managers to become facilitators. He
would need to produce a handbook, not a short pamphlet.
After nearly eight months of effort, he published Mining
Group Gold, a manual that described the basics of group dynamics
and facilitative intervention. His goal was to help managers to
see that their role under Leadership Through Quality had grown.
They now had to "wear two hats." On the one hand, they were
still managers, with "duties and responsibilities that are set
forth in their job description." They often still had to be
directive to fulfill those requirements; they just "didn't have
to be directive in every single thing (they) did. Not using
their family group as a resource to solve problems, improve
quality and make decisions was proving to be a major missed
opportunity." His manual showed managers, in a step-by-step
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Xerox, and from nearly every country in which Xerox had opera-
tions. Very quickly, Kayser found he had to train others to
deliver the program - a fact which worried him, since he knew
fashion, how to shift between the directive component of their
role and the new facilitative component.
The manual was an overwhelming success. So much so, that
Kayser received many requests to design a short training program
to help managers "talk through and practice" the principles of
facilitation. Kayser built a two-day training program around
some specially produced video exercises that displayed effective
and ineffective facilitative behavior in a variety of situations.
When he had completed his design, he planned a delivery schedule
that had him offering the workshop twice a month for two years.
He felt very strongly that only he should actually deliver the
workshop, "to assure consistency in the messages I wanted to
give."
The "Manager As Facilitator" program was first offered in
June of 1985 to managers in Development and Manufacturing. When
word of it got around, it quickly became evident that the only
error Kayser had made was in his estimation of the need for the
program. Requests for the training came from every division of
that the course was influencing the managerial culture of Xerox
and he wanted that to be done with consistency. Over 20,000
Mining Group Gold manuals have been distributed, worldwide since
1985. It has been translated into portugese, Spanish, French,
Japanese, and German. As of September of 1990, when Kayser was
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interviewed for this study, the facilitation skills workshop was
still being offered to Xerox managers.
To Kayser,the success of the "Manager As Facilitator"
workshop was, in hindsight, very understandable. Leadership
Through Quality was about creating a collaborative Quality-
oriented organization. It required group-centered problem
solving and specified the analytical processes and structures
that had to be employed to bring about that change in the organi-
zation. Leadership Through Quality did not, however, specify
"how (one) gets managers (who) are used to (operating) in an
authority system and pretty much being in control, to use these
tools and processes in a collaborative way with their family
groups." As he put it, "We thought if we gave them the tools,
they would know how to use them."
The problem was not one that could be realistically re-
solved by creating an enlarged group of dedicated facilitators
who would be "at the beck and call" of the family groups. The
only practical way to create a collaborative organization was to
give all the firm's managers the capability to facilitate group
problem solving and quality improvement activities and, thereby,
provide them with an active and positive role in the movement to
total quality. The "Manager As Facilitator" workshop was a key
resource to this end.
Changina The Infrastructure To SUDDort LTQ
The concept of a training cascade, together with the LUTI
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/technique, increased the length of time it took for all employees
to be exposed to the mechanics of the Leadership Through Quality
program. In D&M, which contained less than 20 percent of the
Xerox workforce, the training cascade took over a year and a half
to reach all employees. In the u.s. Marketing Group, which had a
much larger number of employees, geographically located all
across the county, the training was to take over four years to
complete.
If training was a necessary requirement for changing the
way Xerox employees handled their work, it was certainly not
sufficient in itself to bring about that result. This fact was
explicitly recognized in the LTQ implementation strategy. As we
have noted, communication was given heavy emphasis, to help
employees to understand the broader context for the quality
program and to minimize any uncertainty they might feel about the
intentions or implications of the program. Role modelling by
senior managers was strongly encouraged to provide good examples
of behavior and assure consistency between actions and words.
And reward and recognition explicitly committed the firm to
providing inducements for compliance with the program's princi-
pIes. Each of these elements, however, required modifications
and/or additions to many of the firm's human resource management
practices. In the earliest days of Leadership Through Quality,
this took the form of selecting processes or programs geared to
the individual employee and "re-orienting them in ways that would
be more supportive of and more consistent with what (was expect-
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ed) of people's behavior." Later, it would involve the creation
of several all new, group-centered processes and programs.
In the area of reward and recognition, the key objective
was to convey to employees the value Xerox now placed on quality
and to encourage them to make quality improvement an integral
part of their job. Identifying how this should be accomplished
was a gradual, trial and error process that continues to this day
and involved changes in how employees are evaluated, promoted,
compensated and recognized. In making these changes, however,
the two major business areas of the firm - Development and
Manufacturing and the U.S. Marketing Group - often took different
paths.
Performance ApDraisal:
One of the first systems to be altered under Leadership
Through Quality was the process by which employees were evaluat-
ed. In Development and Manufacturing under Frank Pipp, the
performance appraisal system had been changed from a five-box,
forced distribution format to one with no summary rating catego-
ries, only a written evaluation of whether negotiated objectives
had been met. This had been done to reduce competitiveness among
employees and to encourage collaboration, goals eminently in line
with the dictates of LTQ. The corporate staff had been using a
no-box system for some time. The U.S. Marketing Group, however,
had not changed its system. It had kept the five box format
because it was felt to be more compatible with the type of work
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/(output more measurable, roles somewhat less interdependent) and
with the type of people (somewhat more achievement-oriented and
competitive) found in the group. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the most significant changes to the evaluation system
under LTQ were initiated in the Marketing area.
The changes involved both the goals of work in the unit and
the criteria by which success would be determined. with regard
to the first of these, the objectives setting process in Market-
ing was modified to require all employees to "have objectives
related to quality and to the improvement of their work process-
es." Every manager was to develop an understanding and command
of the LTQ statistical tools and analytical processes and encour-
age their application by all employees to their unit's perfor-
mance.
The second change modified the summary rating scale found
at the end of the performance evaluation forms. That scale was
re-oriented around "levels of achievement in meeting customer
requirements," reflecting the fundamental LTQ principle that
quality was ultimately defined by the customer. "Meeting objec-
tives" was no longer to be the key criteria for success, "satis-
fying customer needs" was now the primary focus of performance in
the Marketing Group.
Promotional Practices and the Concept of the Role Model Manager:
An even more powerful statement of Xerox's commitment to
quality was made when the promotional practices of the firm were
82
modified in the late 1980's. For years, Xerox had used a sophis-
ticated succession planning process called MRP, Management Re-
source Planning~ to assure the orderly development and deployment
of managerial talent. The MRP program required managers above a
certain grade level to identify replacement candidates for key
positions in their organization, "to look at their organization's
bench strength" in light of future business goals and initia-
tives. Under the program, managers were required to meet with
their subordinates annually and discuss the subordinate's career
goals and the types of jobs the subordinate might be eligible
for, as well as the skills needed for advancement to those jobs.
Leadership Through Quality placed a new set of requirements
on the firm and-its leaders. The corporate senior management
recognized that these new requirements would have to be formally
incorporated into the firm's promotional practices else they
would not be taken seriously. Hal Tragash was given the task of
"recodifying the trait characteristics for the evaluation of
upward potential and mobility of managers."
Tragash and his colleagues on the corporate Human Resources
staff began this enterprise by examining some benchmark data on
managerial behavior in other firms that emphasized quality,
including the Japanese. They recognized, however, that ultimate-
ly their delineation of appropriate managerial behavior had to be
derived from the specific business needs of Xerox, the require-
ments of Leadership Through Quality and the firm's unique cu1-
ture. Working closely with corporate senior management, espe-
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cially David Kearns, Paul Allaire (Xerox's President) and Norman
Rickard. (VP for benchmarking), and various quality officers they
brainstormed a profile of what was to become known as the "role
model manager."
The profile they developed ultimately addressed performance
in business results, Leadership Through Quality, human resource
management, teamwork and corporate values. Work sheets were
developed which described the specific behaviors that were to be
looked for when rating performance in each area. For each area
of performance, three rating categories were defined: role model
(person serves as a standard of excellence worthy of imitation);
competent (person is qualified, capable and demonstrates satis-
factory performance); and development required (person does not
consistently use the required processes or behaviors, and re-
quires additional support or development). When the new MRP
system was first put in place in the mid-1980'S, managerial
candidates for promotion were required to have a "role-model"
rating in at least three of the five rating areas. With time,
"role-model" ratings were looked for in all five areas.
What is particularly noteworthy about the role-model trait
characteristics is that they were neither static in content nor
equally emphasized in practice. With regard to content, the
behavioral descriptions of a role model manager became much more
specific as the firm came to better understand the internal
dynamics of a quality-driven organization. To some extent, this
was a matter of shifting from general statements of how managers
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should "support their people" or "assure that people receive the
training necessary to start living quality" to more detailed and
demanding statements (i.e. "personally uses, and encourages
others to use, the process tools including Problem Solving, the
Quality Improvement Process, Competitive Benchmarking and Cost of
Quality in all key decisions.")
In a telling vignette, Tragash described how the £volution
of the role model trait characteristics "came about accidentally,
as much as by plan." with the reductions in force of the early
1980's and the corporate emphasis on employee involvement in
problem solving, managers throughout the organization were forced
to shift decision making authority deeper in the organization.
The manufacturing and service parts of the firm were particularly
fertile areas for this activity. In part because "these are the
people who really do concrete things; you can see and touch and
measure very visibly what they're doing."
As Tragash and his colleagues scanned the internal environ-
ment to better understand managerial behavior in the world they
were creating, they "stumbled across a team in Oklahoma that had
several semi-autonomous tech rep (technical representative) teams
and a very skillful field service manager who was really model-
ling the role of the facilitator-coach (in a) multi-team environ-
ment." They interviewed the manager, named Thomas Andrews, and
his people about how the teams functioned and the manager's role
in helping them to perform. What clearly emerged was the notion
that semi-autonomous groups have a strong expectation that their
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/manager be a skillful teacher, that he/she be able to coach group
members on the use of analytical tools and help them to better
understand the larger business context in which they were operat-
ing. This was a valuable insight that expanded corporate under-
standing of the new managerial role. Tragash summarizes this
evolutionary learning process well: "I've found, over the
years...you plan a campaign, and then you hit the beach and
(find) there's something on the beach you didn't plan for. But
somebody figured out how to get around it. (So you look at what
they did, and) you change your plan. You're always fighting the
last war. Same thing here. Someone on the beach figured out
they had to be a teacher...You learn from what's happening out
there."
In addition to changing the content of the trait character-
istics over time, the firm also placed greater emphasis on
certain behaviors at given points in time when the MRP forms were
being filled out. This differential emphasis reflected particu-
lar internal needs that had become evident either because of
recent performance shortfalls or new strategic initiatives. As
an example, in the 1990 MRP forms managers are advised that: "A
key consideration for 1990 is Employee Development. To be
considered a 'Role Model' an individual must excel in this area
before other factors are taken into consideration."
When the MRP process changes were introduced in the late
1980's, it sent a powerful signal to managers about the impor-
tance of Leadership Through Quality. competence in the LTQ
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processes and techniques was clearly required of all managers.
And those expected to move ahead in the organization had a
"gauntlet" thrown down in front of them: either become an expert
practitioner of the principles of Leadership Through Quality or
face career limitations.
compensation Practices:
While administration of the rules for career advancement is
a powerful vehicle of cultural transformation, it has the disad-
vantage of being a longer term mechanism for rewarding appropri-
ate behavior. Compensation practices, on the other hand, offer a
more immediate lever to induce change. Recognizing this, Xerox
made several modifications to its compensation systems to support
the LTQ implementation.
The first of these involved the firm's merit review and
reward process. Historically, Xerox had employed a merit deliv-
ery system that was tied to the firm's performance appraisal
cycle. All employees were on a common review date and merit
salary increases were given out in March, with the amount of
increase determined by the individual's performance and the
centrally determined merit increase budget for that year.
Around the time the performance appraisal system in Devel-
opment and Manufacturing was being altered to the "no-box"
format, the decision was also made to modify the merit delivery
process throughout the firm. The old system provided managers
with only one variable to manipulate when rewarding performance:
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amount of increase. The new system added another: timing of the
increase. Under the new system, managers could now vary the
amount of reward and the length of time between consecutive merit
increases from as little as nine months to a maximum of two
years. This was a significant change in compensation philosophy
for Xerox.
When this modification was put in place, (in 1986 for
senior executives, 1987 for the rest of the salaried exempt
population) Leadership Through Quality was not the primary factor
driving the change. Of foremost importance was a desire to
increase the equity of the compensation system. The merit
delivery system was supposed to distribute increases in such a
way that the highest performers got the most money. In fact,
however, the actual distribution of percentage increases was
rather narrow. For example, if the merit increase plan called
for a compensation increase of five percent, on average, for the
entire workforce, over 90 percent of all employees would typical-
ly get raises of between four and six percent, a range that did
not provide a strong inducement to excel. By giving managers the
capability of giving raises more frequently, it was hoped the
overall dispersion would increase.
A second factor driving the merit system modifications was
a desire to change employees' expectations about their raises.
In the past, employees expected increases that were solely in
proportion to the quality of their performance over the past
year. Few considered how well they were paid, in general, either
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in terms of overall level or location within a salary range. It
was hoped that by adding time between increases as a criterion,
managers could help employees to focus more on their relative
value to the company and the long-term picture of their career
and compensation progression, and not simply on last year's
performance rewards.
In principle, the changes to the merit delivery system had
the potential to help induce short term behavioral change compat-
ible with Leadership Through Quality. Employees who performed
acceptably could now be rewarded more frequently, thus reinforc-
ing positive behavior. In practice, however, the new system has
not been popular with the line organization. It has proven to be
difficult for managers to explain and, more important, to admin-
ister. As one compensation specialist put it, "...to be very
honest with you, I think it's probably more of a negative than a
positive (up to now), although I think it has the potential to be
a positive when we get to use it better..."
Perhaps the most strikingly direct example of compensation
practices being used to reinforce Leadership Through Quality can
be found in the u.s. Marketing Group. As we have noted, a
fundamental principle of LTQ is the notion that quality is
meeting the requirements of the customer. In the Marketing area,
this principle has been formalized by structural changes and
supporting compensation programs that tie the compensation of
influential managers to the performance of their units in meeting
customer expectations.
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The need for these changes was made evident, in part,
through monthly surveys of customers that assesses how their
dealings with Xerox have gone. Customers are asked to rate such
things as product performance, service responsiveness and the
behavior of sales personnel. At the end of the survey, there is
a global question about overall customer satisfaction.
Xerox closely tracks the results of this survey, particu-
larly the global question. In the mid-1980's, when LTQ was first
initiated, it was not unusual to find that only about 70-75
percent of Xerox customers rated its performance as satisfactory.
As LTQ took root in the firm, these numbers began to steadily
climb upward, although not as quickly as management might have
desired.
Analysis of customer complaints indicated that a signifi-
cant barrier to satisfying customer requirements was the strong
functional orientation of the marketing organization. The field
operations of the u.s. Marketing Group are geographically divided
into 65 Districts, with three primary functions in each District:
sales, service and business operations. Before Leadership
Through Quality, each of these functional areas operated somewhat
independently of the others. within such an organization "...all
of the dependencies (were) vertical and functional, all of the
peer (interactions), mentoring (activities) and non-formal
(aspects of organizational life were) functional and vertical..."
As a result, the different functional areas were very ethnocent-
ric in pursuit of business goals and not well-coordinated in
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dealing with the customer. Indeed, the firm was getting feedback
that suggested their customers felt as though "they were dealing
with different entities at Xerox who didn't seem to be talking to
each other."
To meet this problem, the Marketing Group made several
radical structural and procedural changes to its field opera-
tions. The changes reflected a strategic decision that District
operations were "the center of (Xerox's) business and everyone in
a given District should be focused on satisfying the needs of
customers in the District...
From a structural perspective, this was accomplished first
by changing how accountability for performance would be defined.
Under the old system of accountability, the District Managers of
sales, service and business operations were each held accountable
for maximizing a set of functional performance measures for their
area of responsibility. The new system required the three
functional managers in a District to become a "Partnership" with
shared accountability for "common goals" in the District. The
common goals dealt with both customer satisfaction and major
business results. In essence, the District became a small
business, managed jointly by three managers.
To allow managers the freedom to truly manage the District
as a business, the firm devised a set of "empowerments" - permis-
sion to use new ways of approaching work - that could be employed
by District Managers to improve results. The intention behind
this action was that successive levels of the organization -
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headquarters, the Regions (groupings of Districts), the Districts
- would each allow greater flexibility and autonomy to those
below. It was hoped that through such action the District
Managers would recognize "that they shouldn't be just looking up
and waiting for orders as to what should be happening, that they
should take responsibility (for making things happen)." District
Managers were encouraged to develop a vision for their District
and implement it.
To test the "Partnership" concept, the Marketing Group
chose six Districts to be pilot sites. The Districts were
carefully selected to be sure they had "the kind of marketing
territories and leadership" that would be supportive of this
concept.
The pilot results showed that the new accountability
structure helped enormously to focus the organization on the
customer's needs. It was also clear, however, that the new
structure would be difficult for managers to get used to.
Empowerment was not simply a matter of telling managers that they
could now do certain things or take more risks. These things
would happen only after managers became convinced that "if you go
do it, you won't be shot at dawn." For such confidence to grow,
it was necessary that managers at the Regional level hand off
power to the Districts, allow them the freedom to experiment and,
most of all, not take a functional view of business issues. This
was difficult for them to do during the pilot and remains so to
this day. Managers in the Regional offices suspected that the
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Partnership strategy obviated the need for the Regions. This
fear was and is compounded by the fact that no clear role for the
Regions has been specified to date. Regional Managers were told:
"We want involved Districts. Your job is to coach and nurture
empowered District Partners. Help these people become as autono-
mous as possible as business people, and then we'll figure out
what to do with you. (This) was not the most comforting scena-
rio if you're (confronted with radical change and are being asked
to commit to it)." Russ Chappell, a training manger in the
Marketing Group who was heavily involved in the implementation of
the Partnership strategy, feels this conflict was inevitable.
"We basically saw the Region as a temporary necessity, but the
problem (was) we acted like that was so (and thus) we got mixed
compliance and mixed execution from the Region."
The Partnership concept was formally rolled out into the
Marketing Group in 1987. In looking back on the process,
Chappell has observed that Partnership "was, for us here in
Marketing, probably a more profound transformation that was
Leadership Through Quality. (We were mindful) of the fact that
it was a culture change, but we didn't put the kind of resources
and strategic planning behind it..that we did for Leadership
Through Quality... (Even with that implementation weakness,)
people said, this is right! (We) should have done this a long
time ago. The essential rightness of the (strategy) kind of
overrode whatever inelegance we (displayed) in launching it. l.t
was better than ~ were."
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To support the partnership strategy and to encourage
continuous movement toward the firm's avowed goal of 100 percent
customer satisfaction, the Marketing Group made some significant
modifications to its compensation programs. First among these
was the creation of a bonus program for key managers that tied
compens3tion to the customer satisfaction targets of their unit,
with customer satisfaction measured through the monthly survey
described above. The actual amount of the bonus was determined
by performance against business results, such as profit and
revenue growth. However, access to the bonus was tied to perfor-
mance against the customer satisfaction target. Thus, a manager
could perform very well against business goals, but not receive a
bonus because the customer satisfaction rating of his/her unit
was too low. To add un additional inducement for performance,
the program put up to 20 percent of the manager's base salary at
risk. On the up side, however, if performance goals were exceed-
ed , managers could earn back as much as 40 percent of base
salary through the bonus.
In implementing the bonus program, the Marketing Group took
care to protect managers from being unfairly penalized by system-
ic weaknesses in the firm that acted to limit performance. Money
was very important to these managers, they knew their value in
the employment market and they would vote with their feet if they
felt they were not being treated equitably. Thus, the compensa-
tion group in Marketing carefully tracked managerial performance
against bonus potential on a quarterly basis so that systemic
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inhibitors to performance, or issues that had not been taken into
account in designing the bonus program, could be identified. In
cases where such problems arose, the firm adjusted the compen-
sation plan or provided for an alternate means of paying for
performance so that managers were not unnecessarily vulnerable.
An important serendipitous result of a bonus program of
this type was that it increased managerial sensitivity to struc-
tural or systemic inhibitors to satisfying customer needs.
william Strusz, manager of compensation for the Marketing Group
puts this well: "...its axiomatic. You put people's pay and
recognition at risk, they're going to tell you what the barriers
are to their achieving them..." Thus, the administration of the
bonus program became an important vehicle for the organization to
learn about itself and to modify internal dynamics. This hap-
pened two ways. First, there was a greater flow of information
upward about operational difficulties. senior management was,
therefore, better informed and could take action more effective-
ly. Second, managers out in the field were encouraged to look at
their operation more critically and, thus, could more precisely
guide their employees' application of the Quality Improvement and
Problem Solving Processes.
The bonus program impacted all managerial personnel in the
Districts. The District Partners had the largest amount of
salary at risk, but stood to gain a very large reward if perfor-
mance was good. Managers who reported to the Partners had less
at risk and received commensurately less reward.
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The same could not be said for service and administrative manag-
ers. They had always been compensated with a straight salary and
the spectre of having some of their salary at risk was quite
From a psychological perspective, sales managers were least
impacted, as they had been under a bonus system for some time.
upsetting. For that reason, the amount of buy-in required of
second level managers was and continues to be a subject of
considerable study and experimentation.
In addition to these changes to managerial compensation,
the Marketing Group also altered the system used to pay first
level employees - those with direct customer contact. In 1989,
these employees were put under a modest gainsharing program that
offered them rewards beyond their base compensation. The program
did not employ an intricate formula like those typically found in .
sophisticated gainsharing programs. It was simply designed to
focus employees on the common goals of their District and to
encourage District-level performance improvement. On a quarterly
basis, District profitability and performance against common
goals is measured against performance during a comparable period
in the previous year. If sufficient improvements have'occurred,
and customer satisfaction targets have been met (as a qualifier)
then the program channels money back to the employees in the
District. On a bottom-line basis, the program allows employees
to potentially earn a modest compensation increase - (10 percent
of all gains are shared) about one or two percent of their base
salary per year. In the words of Compensation Manager William
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Strusz, "It's_not big enough to make people say 'Wow, I'm getting
rich!
'
But it's big enough for them to pay attention to what the
(common) goals are and (to track) how we're doing against them.
(This, hopefully, will then lead them to ask) what (they) can do
to make things work better."
The gainsharing program has not proven to be easy to
implement. Special systems had to be created to measure results
and to pay out rewards, and these are still being fine-tuned.
Some Districts have been reluctant to implement the system
because it "conflicted with other things they were doing."
The Service area was, perhaps, the greatest source of
opposition to the program. Service, under Vice President Charles
Ray, had historically been one of the most innovative parts of
Xerox. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, when Development and
Manufacturing was experimenting with QWL activities, service was
also exploring the feasibility of involving employees more
heavily in the design and control of their own work. Ray and his
colleagues in Service had recognized that geographically assigned
service technical representatives provided a "natural community"
of workers who could solve problems and seek work process im-
provements. These employees were formalized into Service Work
Teams that, to varying degrees, assessed the service needs in
their area, planned for resource allocation against needs and
coordinated the delivery of needed services.
The structure proved quite successful and to support it
Service designed a gainsharing program, known as PROSHARE, to
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encourage improvement in service performance measures, such as
service expense to revenue ratio. This system had been in place
for several years when the Partnership-related gainsharing
program was implemented and as a result, the new program was not
well-received in Service. with the new program, compensation
adjustments for Service personnel were no longer going to be made
on the basis of performance against narrow, service-oriented
functional measures that were clearly under the control of the
Service Work Teams. They would be tied to broader common goals
which were a shared responsibility of all in the District, not
just the Service Tech Reps. with the move to a cross-functional
orientation, however, no other system was deemed feasible and the
Service Teams have been forced to accommodate.
Recoqnition:
In the Leadership Through Quality implementation strategy,
defined in the Green Book, Xerox explicitly distinguished between
reward and recognition as levers for inducing change within the
organization. Both were seen as significant contributors and the
strategy document called for an evaluation of all reward and
recognition systems and practices for compatibility with the
objectives of the Quality program. That assessment indicated
that while Xerox had numerous recognition programs in its operat-
ing units, they were designed to acknowledge individual not group
performance. This was clearly problematic, as group-level
analysis of internal operations was the core of the Quality
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Improvement Process.
Having individual-level reward and recognition systems in a
group-centered world had been shown to be awkward during the
early days of the QWL program. As previously noted, in some
manufacturing units, problem solving groups had availed them-
selves of the unit's suggestion system as a way to receive
recognition and reward for innovative, cost saving ideas. Such
.systems had been created as a vehicle for improvement ideas to
flow upward from the non-salaried workforce. Managerial and, in
some cases, salaried professional personnel were not eligible to
participate in the suggestion system. However, many of the QWL
problem solving groups had managerial, supervisory or technical
specialists as members. In these cases, teams seeking monetary
reward would often submit suggestions under the name of one of
the non-salaried members and, if an award was given to that
person, he/she would share it with the other group members. Such
actions were clearly contrary to policy and led to controversy.
Although the firm often turned a blind eye to the problem in the
short run, it led to suggestion systems becoming gradually
discredited in many areas in the firm. only recently has Xerox
begun to re-emphasize such systems, as benchmarking has shown
them to be an important contributor to continuous improvement.
To address the issue of group performance recognition,
Xerox created a team-centered award program that paralleled the
system it had in place to recognize individuals. Individual
recognition activities ranged in magnitude from simple thank
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you's, plaques and modest gifts to the President's Award, given
annually to carefully selected employees who had made especially
noteworthy contributions to corporate performance. The
President's Award carried with it a monetary award of up to 50
percent of salary.
The team-centered program is called Team Excellence and was
born in Development and Manufacturing in late 1984. Tom McMullen,
Tom Kayser, Nick Argona and the D&M Quality Network, iupressed
with the success of Teamwork Day, conceived the idea of formally
recognizing the best of the D&M teams. They wanted to provide
some special recognition for the few truly outstanding teams by
giving them a chance to tell their success stories directly to
-the senior staff of D&M. Like so many other aspects of Leader-
ship Through Quality, the Team Excellence process went through a
number of refinements and has been implemented somewhat differ-
ently in different Business units.
Team Excellence has two basic elements: a certification
program and a performance competition. To take part in the
program, a group of employees must first establish itself as a
team. A team can be any group of three or more Xerox employees
who "share clearly understood goals; work together to achieve
those goals; use a disciplined, structured approach to problem-
solving; and achieve results which are valuable to Xerox." In
most Business Units, to be certified as an Excellent Team the
group must submit itself for evaluation by a facilitator, manager
or team sponsor. Early on, teams were rated on a scale of zero
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to five in five performance categories: 1) team integrity (mem-
bers know and behave in a way that shows they are committed to
team goals and these goals reach beyond the immediate work area
and clearly contribute to the broader organizational objectives
of increase market share and improved return on assets); 2)
process discipline (members assiduously apply the Problem-Solving
Process, the Quality Improvement Process or other analytical
tools in their work together); 3) results (the problem solution
suggested by the team must be implemented and should lead to
verifiable improvements in organizational performance); 4)
innovation (the team challenges accepted ways of doing things and
shows creativity in developing problem solutions); and 5) team
development (members are open to the development of newinterper-
sonal and analytical skills, help each other to grow in profi-
ciency and develop a bond of mutual trust and respect). To be
certified as an Excellent Team, the group must receive a score of
at least "4" in all five rating categories. In recent years,
only three rating categories have been used: results, innovation
and teamwork. These categories are weighted differentially, with
"results" accounting for 70 percent of the evaluation, "innova-
tion" 15 percent, and "teamwork" 15 percent.
Once a team has been certified as Excellent, it can be
nominated to enter the competitive phase of the Team Excellence
Program. Within Business Units, teams so nominated compete
against each other to be named one of the outstanding teams in
the Unit. In the early years of the program, the competing
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groups were required to make a presentation to an evaluation team
from the Business Unit, usually composed of the Business unit
head and his/her direct reports. Presentations were limited in
length, as was the time devoted to questions and answers. The
evaluative criteria used were the same five used for Excellence
certification; however, they were differentially weighted depend-
ing on the performance needs of the organization, with process
getting more emphasis at one time, results at another.
Business units were given quotas for the number of out-
standing teams they could name, with the winners moving on to a
company-wide competition, held in Leesburg, Virginia at the Xerox
Training Center. There competing teams presented to corporate
senior management with seven teams chosen as winners. Winning
team members in the Business Unit competition each received a
plaque and a one thousand dollar award. Teams awarded the Team
Excellence Award in Leesburg received an elaborate personal
momento and each team split a monetary award of up to $25,000.
Additionally, teams that made it to Leesburg had the opportunity
to take part in some special developmental programs and social
activities in Washington, D.C. and, most important, could inter-
act with the senior executives of the firm.
The recognition program was not without its flaws. Most
important among these was the competitive nature of the Leesburg
part of the program. The size of the monetary award at stake led
teams to go to great lengths to outdo each other in the elabo-
rateness of their presentations. since teamwork was what the
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whole program was supposed to be celebrating, this competition
was at a minimum unseemly and at worst completely incompatible
with the basic philosophy of Leadership Through Quality. To
reduce the competitiveness, the monetary award was dropped in
favor of a gift to each winning team member. In the latest
iteration of the award, even the gift has been dropped. Now, the
benefit to those presenting at Leesburg comes from their in-
creased visibility to the senior leaders of the firm, their
social interaction with members of other excellent teams and the
recognition of the Award trip.
Another concern that arose as the Team Excellence Program
was implemented was the question of bias in the evaluation
process. Were the teams that made the most significant contribu-
tion and showed the greatest expertise getting the Award, or was
the Award going to those that made the best presentation?
To address this concern, some units in Xerox now use a peer
review process to evaluate team performance. In each of the last
two years, a quality evaluation committee, made up of non-manage-
rial employees, interviews each of the teams about what the team
actually did to address its problem. Avowed team performance
results are tested against actual customer perceptions and
feedback is given to the team about how their customers really
see them. This peer reviews data is then channelled upward for
use in the Team Excellence evaluation, with the committee making
recommendations to management about the teams that should really
be in the competition.
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Increasing The Pace Of Change Through A Personal Contracting
strategy
By mid-1986, the training cascade had thrust Leadership
Through Quality deep into the Xerox organization. In Development
and Manufacturing virtually everyone had been exposed to the
quality principles and processes. Marketing would still require
more time to touch everyone because of the large number and
geographic spread of its employees.
As senior management examined the pace of change within the
firm, however, it was becoming evident that simple exposure to
training was not alone going to bring about the commitment of
some employees to the quality principles. Some influential
managers still did not think the firm was serious about quality.
Others did not like the program because it challenged their
managerial prerogatives. Finally, some thought that since David
Kearns, the strongest advocate for LTQ, was moving away from
operational involvement in day-to-day matters, the program would
fade away.
Paul Allaire, the President of Xerox at that time, recog-
nized that the pace of the implementation would increase only if
everyone realized that Allaire was as committed to LTQ as was
Kearns. To bring this about he devised a personal contracting
strategy. As part of the annual objectives setting process, he
met individually with what he felt were the key opinion makers in
the business to discuss how important LTQ was to the future of
the firm. Each of these influential managers was asked for
his/her support for the quality program. That support was to be
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expressed in a set of explicit commitments defining precisely
what each of them would do to promulgate the program. Once such
support was defined, each of these managers held similar sessions
with influential managers below them in the organization.
Through this strategy, the key 100 managers in the corporation
were linked to Leadership Through Quality through a series of
interlocking personal commitments that defined their level of
support for the program. with such commitment by the major
"culture carriers" of the organization, the inevitability of the
quality program became increasingly evident to all and the pace
of transformation increased. By 1988, the firm was ready to try
for the Baldrige Award.
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/III. SOME LESSONS FROM THE XEROX TRANSFORMATION
The preceding narrative has been constructed to reflect the
range of activities that were undertaken by Xerox employees in
pursuit of corporate renewal. Its broad goal has been to take
the process of organizational transformation out of the
antiseptic realm of corporate strategy and to depict it as a
social process, with human actors. In doing so, it has attempted
to highlight the "people" issues that arise in such change
efforts and to explore the role of the Human Resources function
in providing "levers" to promote and advance the goal of
organizational transformation. Given the size and complexity of
Xerox, it is inevitable that important events have not found
their way into the story. Our hope, however, is that the
narrative captures the essential flavor of the change process in
such a way that the lessons of Xerox can be applied by others
seeking organizational improvement. In this section of the
report, we would like to illuminate some of the key policy
lessons suggested by the Xerox experience.
Develop A Vision To Guide Renewal
Students of large-scale organizational change have often
observed that successful change efforts are generally guided by a
captivating "vision of the future". At times such a vision comes
from the creative insight of a dynamic leader. At other times,
it grows out of a rigorous participative process of
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organizational self-analysis that takes account of both internal
capacities and environmental realities. Whatever its source, if
clearly articulated it acts to galvanize the attention of
organizational members and becomes a shared aspiration for what
the organization can become.
In Xerox's case, it seems clear that the firm's vision of
what would be required lor competitive success was neither the
product of one person's imagination, nor the result of a formal
strategic planning process. Instead, the recognition that change
would be necessary and the defining parameters of such change
evolved over a period of years, with contributions coming from
employees at all levels of the organizational hierarchy.
stresses in the technical system of the organization - how
Xerox actually created and marketed its products - were the
driving factors in providing an impetus for change. Such
performance shortfalls became evident as selected employees
looked outward to other organizations and compared Xerox's
methods and results to those found elsewhere.
At the highest levels of Xerox, a very important factor in
changing the self-satisfied, ethnocentric orientation of the firm
was the model of organizational performance provided by Fuji
Xerox. Here was an organization that was very similar to its
parent, yet in many respects was ahead of it on the performance
curve. The competitive dynamics of the Japanese copier market
were clearly suggestive of what could happen in the United
states. Fuji Xerox's performance weaknesses, erosion of market
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position and subsequent renewal by orienting itself around
quality were tracked closely by Xerox senior executives,
particularly David Kearns. Benchmarking trips to Japan, arranged
by Fuji Xerox provided information that challenged assumptions
about how the business should be approached and suggested
alternative strategies.
The existence of such a tangible model helped to change the
context of corporate self-evaluation and undoubtedly helped
senior executives to accept and act on the critical evaluation of
the firm undertaken by the management consulting firm, McKinsey &
Company. It also led to a curiosity about employee participation
and a willingness to experiment with the concept and provided a
fundamental design template for Leadership Through Quality.
While speculation can be dangerous, it is reasonable to reflect
on whether Xerox would have been moved to action as expeditiously
without this influential internal model for success.
Assign Someone To Develop The Vision
Employee participation was the first major element of what
was to become the new Xerox to be formally put into place. A
significant factor in the institutionalization of this concept in
the firm was the creation of a corporate staff position to
oversee its implementation. Hal Tragash, the first role
occupant, in essence became the physical manifestation of senior
management's commitment to the concept. While grass roots
experimentation with participation had been going on for several
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years, Tragash became a catalyst for action, pulling together
this disparate experimentation and imparting institutional
legitimacy to it. As an ombudsman for participation he educated
senior management about the range of participative activities
that could be implemented; helped to plan additional experiments
with it; intervened to remove political roadblocks or to
facilitate high-level decision making around the concept; and
provided visibility to participation by channelling information
about its successes, and implementation difficulties, upward to
the highest levels of the corporation. Through such activities,
Tragash became an important facilitator of organizational
learning, assuring that grass roots experience became an
important contributor to high level strategy formulation.
Use Hiqh-Ievel Champions To Unfreeze The Culture
The organizational change literature contains numerous
references to the impact of champions on the change process.
These are individuals who look critically at the organization,
identify what has to be different, and assiduously advocate the
new over the old. Xerox certainly had such individuals. David
Kearns, Frank Pipp, Dominick Argona, Tom Kayser and John Foley
are five who come readily to mind as being willing to both take a
risk on a new idea and allocate resources to bring it into the
organization.
Less frequently discussed is the use of strategic
appointments to facilitate change, although this too is quite
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common in organizational life. Xerox used this technique with
the appointment of Frank Pipp to head up the Development and
Manufacturing organization in the early 1980's. Pipp was a
strong believer in employee participation and clearly recognized
the negative impact of the bureaucratic and political managerial
culture on Xerox performance. As a highly experienced and
respected manager, he was ideally suited to the task of forcing
the organization to confront its basic assumptions about how it
should operate. Nearing retirement, he could confront internal
matters directly - could, so to speak, "rattle the organization's
cage" - without worry that his career would be at risk. And with
a sensitivity to the symbolic side of management, he became an
influential and uncompromising model of managerial excellence in
both word and deed.
Encourage Union Involvement in All Phases of Transformation
A factor that had a very positive impact on the turnaround
of Xerox's business fortunes was the cooperative industrial
relations climate in the firm. The Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers Union had a very enlightened leadership that had
learned a powerful lesson when the textile industry had died in
Rochester. Seeing this industry move offshore to low cost labor
markets, they well understood how the fundamental economics of an
industry could change and they did not want to see something
similar happen to Xerox.
The union leadership's ability to cooperate with Xerox on
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corporate renewal was encouraged enormously by the company's
willingness to bring them into the renewal process at the
beginning. senior ACTWU leadership met frequently with senior
corporate executives to examine corporate performance and discuss
and plan for improvement. This high level dialogue, with its
spirit of openness and shared concern, set a tone within the
organization that allowed the difficult, painful structural
changes to the way work was organized and staffed to be
accomplished as expeditiously as possible.
In the area of employee participation, this spirit of
cooperation was made tangible by the joint structure that was put
in place to manage its implementation. This intricate
hierarchical structure of committees gave the union a strong hand
to influence participative activities and, by doing so, to
protect its interests and the interests of its members. Indeed,
time and again in our discussions with both union and management
personnel at Xerox, it was suggested that the ultimate success of
employee participation within the firm was due to the union's
advocacy and protection of the concept.
While Xerox made the right moves by involving the union in
the design and implementation of both employee participation and
the downsizing effort of the early 1980's, they erred seriously
by not doing so for the Leadership Through Quality program. Not
doing so made LTQ a "management-driven" program and raised fears
at the lower levels of the firm that the Quality program was
somehow supplanting the participation program. The union was
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shocked that management would unilaterally create a program that
subsumed employee participation without consulting it. The
ensuing turmoil led to the needless expenditure of emotional
energy by union employees and QWL facilitators, alienated union
leadership, clearly slowed the Leadership Through Quality
Implementation in the manufacturing area and has led David
Kearns, Xerox's Chairman, to comment that excluding the union was
one of the worst decisions he has made.
Manage the Context of Change
The process of large-scale organizational change is
unsettling to many members of an organization. Such change
disrupts established patterns. Assumptions and beliefs about the
nature of the enterprise are brought into question; behaviors
that were once functional, are no longer acceptable. Learning
the new and un-learning the old become central concerns each day.
An important component of implementing such change
effectively is managing the larger context of the change. This
is a matter of helping people who must live with the consequences
of a large-scale change to understand the reasons why such change
is necessary. Openly sharing information about organizational
performance is a minimal requirement, if this is to be
accomplished.
Xerox recognized this fact very early in its renewal
efforts. Competitive data gathered by senior executives on their
trips to Japan had had a powerful impact on how they saw their
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organization. When shared with senior union officials it built a
strong case for experimentation with employee participation and
clearly pointed to the need for significant change in the
corporation's cost base. Recognizing that such competitive
disparities would require a significant reduction in force, the
firm created, with the.help of the ACTWU, a sophisticated
communications strategy ("The Choice Is Ours") to educate the
work force about Xerox's position in the marketplace. While the
message was not popular, its comprehensiveness and the candor of
its presentation helped employees to see the corporation through
"new eyes" and was, perhaps, the key factor influencing
acceptance of the 1983 contract.
Create a Cadre of Dedicated Internal Change Aaents
The grass roots involvement of Xerox employees in the
analysis and modification of its internal activities has been a
fundamental contributor to the turn-around of Xerox's business
fortunes. Bringing about such involvement, however, was not a
simple matter. In both the QWL program and Leadership Through
Quality, employee participation was a group-centered activity.
For many employees, meeting with colleagues to analyze problems
and develop solutions was an entirely new activity that required
analytical and interpersonal skills that had not been needed in
the Xerox of old.
To train employees in these skills, to help small working
groups to understand the intricacies of group dynamics and to
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/facilitate the shift away from a hierarchical, management
dominated culture, Xerox created a cadre of dedicated internal
change agents. In the earliest days of the corporate renewal,
whether in the unionized manufacturing operations or in the non-
union parts of the firm, such employees were generally
characterized as trainers who had some responsibility for helping
employees to actually use new conce?ts. The employees selected
for this role, however, were chosen in part for their strong
commitment to the philosophy of employee participation. with
such strong belief in what they were doing, many came to act out
a broader role for themselves. They became advocates for
participation and frequently appeared to be the conscience of the
participative process. This often brought them into conflict
with managers who resisted or undercut participative activities,
because they did not really understand the benefits of such
activities, did not believe in them or were threatened by them.
The difficulty of the internal change agent role was
compounded by the lack of clarity in the definition of the role.
Were these employees to bE only trainers for the problem solving
teams or were they to be consultants to the larger organization
to which they were assigned, helping both employees and managers
to master the skills and interactive style required of a
participative world? What was to be their relationship to the
top line manager in their area? Should they report to this
manager directly, or to a centralized personnel function? Were
line managers required to use these change agents in specific
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/ways as resources to help them manage their responsibilities more
If so, did they even know how to do so? Did thiseffectively?
role fill a temporary need within the organization during a time
of transition, or was this a professional function that was to
become a necessary and vital concomitant to the internal dynamics
of the new Xerox?
Xerox struggled with these and mallY other questions around
the internal change agent role during both the QWL program and
Leadership Through Quality. Some issues were resolved, others
Among the important lessons learned byremain open to this day.
the corporation were:
0 In the early stages of a renewal effort, a group of
dedicated internal change agents provides visible evidence
to employees that the firm intends to function in a
different way.
Within the unionized parts of the firm, change agents with
union backgrounds provide a credible communication bridge
between union and management, are a powerful vehicle for
conveying the message of change deep into the organization,
and are better able to relate training materials to the real
world experiences of the shop floor.
0
0 Again within the unionized parts of the firm, the
implementation of employee participation is enhanced when
internal change agents are functionally co-managed by a high
level union official and an upper mid-level manager. At a
macro-level, this creates a system of checks and balances
that assures that the basic tenets of participation are
honored in both spirit and fact. At the micro-level, the
power of the internal change agents is enhanced by their
reporting relationship to a high level union official not
directly subject to managerial influence.
When internal change agents report directly to line
management in an operating area, with only a dotted-line
relationship to the Personnel function, concern over how
they may be evaluated and rewarded by their boss may lead
them to be less assertive in addressing problems resulting
from managerial behavior that is inconsistent with
participation or quality improvement.
0
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/0 On the other hand, when internal change agents report
directly to the Personnel function, they may be less
influential because they are perceived to be focused on
issues peripheral to the core mission of the organization.
0 Internal change agents must be well-schooled in the
fundamental business operations of the area in which they
are operating.
0 Define the internal change agent's role as that of a
consultant, with responsibility for assisting in the
continuous evaluation of all aspects of the workplace
relevant to the core change dimension, whether it be
quality, participation or some other. Additionally, make
them responsible for assisting with the imDlementation of
necessary modifications to the firm's production
environment. Provide change agents with training in
consulting skills and the dynamics of organizational change
to increase their effectiveness when dealing with the higher
levels of the firm.
0 Change agents will be most successful when they are
integrated into the management system of the organization to
which they are assigned. This is most likely to happen when
the line manager of that area and the change agent jointly
define an operating role for the change agent that
compliments the manager's approach to his/her own job.
The notion that employees can profitably serve as change
agents for a limited period of time and then return to their
old job is not realistic. Effectiveness in the role
requires a great deal of new knowledge and skill and
considerable hands-on experience. Such effectiveness also
requires a relationship of trust between organizational
members and the change agent. These take time to develop.
If the tenure in the role is too short, change agents leave
just as they are becoming truly effective.
0
0 Recognize that a cadre of internal change agents shifts day-
to-day responsibility for implementation of the vision away
from line management. To that extent, such change agents
may act to reduce the pressure on managers to learn new
skills and actively support the new internal environment.
Create Mechanisms For Information Sharing. Learnina and Catharsis
Xerox is a very large organization, with great diversity in
its internal environment. Such diversity in internal
characteristics has caused the process of change to take
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different forms and to proceed at a different pace in the various
parts of the organization. The renewal effort was lent coherence
and organizational learning was greatly enhanced by the creation
of internal forums for the sharing of information and experience.
Some of these forums were formal, like the organizational
Effectiveness Network for internal change agents. others were
informal, like the "rap sessions" for plant managers in
manufacturing. Whatever their form, such activities facilitated
the flow of innovation throughout the organization. Equally
important, they provided a mechanism for emotional catharsis, in
which employees attempting to facilitate or manage organizational
change could discuss their frustrations and seek solace and
support from colleagues.
Create ODDortunities For Different "World Views" To Interact
Early in the renewal effort at Xerox, Dominick Argona, one
of the human resource professionals taking a lead role in
formulating approaches to the design of work and in facilitating
experimentation with these approaches, was given managerial
responsibility for a group of behavioral scientists working on
the firm's hiring practices. Interaction with this group led
Argona to see the organization "through a different set of eyes."
He became exposed to a broader set of criteria for evaluating
organizational performance and came to better understand the
social and cultural aspects of organizational life and the
processes through which organizational change is brought about.
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Later, he was able to facilitate the interaction of influential
line managers in manufacturing with some of these scientists,
thus influencing their approach to organizational renewal.
At other points in the renewal effort, our data suggests
that similar exposure to different "world views" changed the way
Xerox employees thought about their business. Benchmarking trips
to Japan helped senior executives to understand new forms of work
,
organization that fundamentally enlarged the role of the first-
line employee and suggested different driving forces for an
organization. Hal Tragash exposed this same group to new
conceptual models, either directly or through the facilitation of
the upward flow of information about grass roots experiments in
organizational improvement. The sharing of basic performance
data with union leaders increased their understanding of the
economics of the copier business and Xerox's competitive position
within it. Whatever the form they took, such exposure to wholly
different perspectives on organizational life challenged
fundamental assumptions and opened the door to the possibility of
new approaches to doing business.
Recognize That structural Chanae Can Be Used To Facilitate
Cultural Change
When employee participation was first implemented at Xerox,
it met with mixed support from managers. Some saw its potential
and were willing to facilitate its development. others were
opposed to it and either threw up roadblocks to participation or
continued to manage in a way that discouraged employee
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involvement. Managerial acceptance of the concept received a
large boost when, in the early 1980's, the firm began to reduce
the size of its supervisory workforce. The effect of this
reduction in force was to significantly increase the span of
control of many managers. In such an environment, a high control
orientation with little delegation of responsibility makes
management a tenuous enterprise. Thus, managers were forced to
involve their subordinates more fully and to push decision-making
responsibility downward, else many operational matters would not
be attended to in timely manner. While this did not constitute
active philosophical support for the concept of participation, it
certainly put in place a set of operating constraints that made
active opposition less likely.
Create MultiDle Mechanisms For Participation*
Several years after the start of the QWL Program at Xerox,
the number of employees volunteering for membership on the
problem-solving teams began to decline. As the participation
program was having a positive impact on corporate performance,
this was not acceptable to Xerox. Its response was to make the
QWL training mandatory for all employees, in the hope that the
training would help employees to better understand the program
and, thus, increase their desire to participate in it. While
some employees were, indeed, encouraged to participate by this
*This section is drawn from Tracinq a Transformation in Industrial
Relations, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management
Relations and Cooperative Programs, BLMR 123, 1988, p. 11-13.
119
/action, the vast majority resented the mandate to attend. As the
polarization of the work force became more evident, Xerox
commissioned a survey to explore employee attitudes about
participation and seek clues about how to approach the issue.
The Components Manufacturing Operations unit in Webster, NY,
employing about 1000 salaried and hourly workers, was chosen to
be the test site. The survey was designed and administered by
Larry Pace, one of Argona's behavioral scientists who had become
Manager For Organizational Effectiveness in Reprographics
Manufacturing, and Ron Mitchell, a graduate student at Cornell
University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations who was
consulting with Xerox.
The survey clearly verified that employees were polarized by
the QWL Program. Some were very favorably disposed toward the
program. Others had no use for it. Of greater interest,
however, was the finding that a very high percentage of Xerox
employees wanted more say in their work, wanted more information
about business operations and company performance and were very
favorably disposed to the idea of employee participation. Thus,
employees wanted participation, but not necessarily through the
mechanism of a QWL program.
To respond to this finding, the firm developed a new
structure for participation in the Components Manufacturing area.
The core of this new structure was the Business Area Work Group
(BAWG), a grouping of hourly employees and supervisors, and
associated engineers and union officials, involved in a
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particular production activity. Supervisors led the groups. Bi-
weekly group meetings to share information were mandatory for all
members. Beyond such meetings, group members "would have the
option to continue any QWL problem-solving groups, to form ad hoc
groups to address specific problems, to serve as 'individual
contributors', and/or to establish themselves as an autonomous
work group."
The BAWG concept has proven to be quite successful. By
providing a range of participative activities, it allows
employees to become involved in a way that is compatible with
their values and current skill levels. It also allows for an
evolution in the depth of any employee's level of participation.
The concept has migrated to other parts of the manufacturing
organization, has increased the number of employees involved in
work improvement activities and has encouraged a move toward
greater levels of autonomy in the work force.
ParticiDativelv Develop A Detailed Strategy For Change: Give It
Symbolic Weight
Interviews with Xerox employees at different levels of the
organization suggest that Leadership Through Quality was
noteworthy to employees as much for the process by which it was
developed, as it was for its content. In the Xerox of old,
meticulous strategy development was not something that was
particularly visible to most employees, it if occurred at all.
What was valued was action and achievement more than rigorous
analysis and planning. This was quite understandable given
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Xerox's historical dominance in the marketplace and its related
internal culture of managerial competition.
The LTQ strategy development process was experienced by most
employees as a departure from past behavior. In this regard, the
comprehensiveness of the strategy, the time devoted to its
development and the concern about buy-in by ihfluential managers
were strong cues that something was different. The early senior
management meetings where the decision was made to build the
company around quality have become part of the lore of the
corporation, described in detail by even those employees who did
not work for the firm at that time. Similarly noteworthy were
the implementation task forces drawn from all major business
units; their struggle to identify the critical infrastructural
bases that had to be touched to reinforce the quality initiative;
and the meetings where senior management was given the
opportunity to "put their fingerprints" on the strategy.
Also important to the renewal effort was the creation of a
strategy document - "The Green Book." As we have noted, this
comprehensive statement of what would have to happen in the
corporation if LTQ was to be successful, developed a totemic aura
within the firm. For those who had access to it, it was evidence
that they were employees of import. For those who did not, it
was a mysterious object that influenced their fate within the
organization. For all, it was a set of principles and a time-
phased plan of action to make those principles come alive, that
helped to make sense of the disruption of internal patterns of
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behavior that accompanied LTQ - something that caused change and
led to uncertainty about the future, and yet made such change
understandable and, thereby, reduced uncertainty.
Recoanize That A Qualitv Proaram Involves A Fundamental Re-desian
Of Manaaerial Work
Xerox recognized that employee participation and LTQ were
basic cultural changes for the organization. Great attention and
resources were devoted to helping employees to learn and apply
new concepts and analytical methods. The focus of this activity
was, however, the first level employee. While there was
awareness that the quality program had implications for
management, the prevailing sentiment seemed to be that managers
would accommodate to it; that they would learn the new processes
and incorporate them into their style with the same facility that
they showed when taking on new tasks. Only with experience did
it become evident that a quality process was really a major new
method of management. As such, it brought into question all the
basic assumptions that guide behavior in the managerial role.
The "hierarchical management system" that had been in use was not
compatible with a quality-based organization. Management in this
new world was far more a matter of facilitation and coaching than
it was of control.
As a result of this initial oversight Xerox, in the words of
one prominent internal change leader, "...really didn't spend
enough time teaching managers how to manage in this new system."
Managers struggled to internalize the new methods, but often
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found that the programming of long habit was not easy to change.
Especially unsettling was the notion that under LTQ, it became
increasingly acceptable to confront one's boss if he/she did
something incompatible with the quality processes. Additionally,
wholly new skills were necessary, but the development of these
was assisted only after managerial frustration became manifest.
Managers heard the messages about doing things differently. In
many cases, however, they simply did not know how. This led to
resentment in some managers, evident to this day, and were it not
for the initiatives taken by internal staff experts like Tom
Kayser to provide training and consultive assistance, this
resentment could have significantly slowed the renewal effort.
Provide Specific Descriptions Of Desired Behavior When Roles Are
Re-Defined
When asked to name the most influential contributors to
cultural transformation within Xerox, internal change agents
frequently point to the specification of role model behaviors for
managers. In a strongly achievement-oriented culttire, managers
naturally focused on the factors that would lead to advancement.
By incrementally defining an ever more specific set of critical
behaviors and skills that were required for promotion, the firm
provided both an unequivocal message that is was committed to a
new way of doing business and a template to help managers to
understand the implications of that new way of doing business for
their role.
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Facilitate Behavioral Feedback When Roles Are Beinq Re-Defined
An important tool that was available to managers as they
tried to function in the new world was the Managerial Styles
Survey. This instrument had been put into place by Frank Pipp to
provide feedback to managers about the effectiveness of their
management style. It was intended as a developmental tool to
help managers "fine tune" their behavior. Managers were
encouraged to meet with their employees to discuss the results
and, through such action, to develop a better understanding of
their shortcomings.
Under Leadership Through Quality, the survey was modified to
help managers see whether they were appropriately using the
quality tools and processes and were supporting the efforts of
their employees. It was required that managers meet with their
subordinates to discuss the results. Additionally, in many parts
of the firm, the results were also sent to the manager's boss.
Thus the survey became not merely a personal developmental tool,
but a mechanism to assure cultural compatibility.
Change is Facilitated and Focused When Strategic Concepts Are
Expressed In Tools
For employees not actually involved in designing strategic
change, such change is often difficult to visualize. The key
question asked by employees is: What does this change in
orientation mean for me as I carry out my day-to-day
responsibilities? The effective management of such change
requires that employees receive assistance in answering this
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question, that the change be made tangible for them.
Xerox discovered early in its renewal efforts that clearly
defined analytical processes can be very powerful mechanisms to
accomplish this. The six-step Problem-Solving Process was
representative of the participative involvement of employees in
organizational renewal. Indeed, for many, participation came to
mean the Problem-Solving Process. The nine-step Quality
Improvement Process provided a focus for employee problem
sOlving. In essence, it defined the meaning of quality for
employees in terms that were related to their actual work. These
processes were tools that transformed abstractions like
participation and quality into behavior that could be seen and
learned. without them, it is doubtful whether the renewal could
have proceeded as well as it did.
Cultural Chanqe Is Facilitated Bv A Riqorous Traininq Cascade
Training is a key element to the success of a Total Quality
implementation. Employees must learn new analytical and
interactive skills if they are to participate constructively in
organizational improvement activities. One of the frequently
observed problems with business training, however, is that the
new knowledge imparted typically has a very short half-life in
the consciousness of recent trainees. Simply exposing employees
to new concepts is no guarantee that they will actually apply
them. Additionally, even when employees are disposed to apply
newly learned concepts, they may be discouraged from doing so by
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incompatible behavior by organizational superiors.
Xerox addressed these problems through a four step training
cascade process called LUTI -- Learn, Use, Teach and Inspect.
starting at the very top of the firm, senior executives were
trained in the quality principles and tools. They were then
required to actually apply the new learnings to a real business
problem, with the results of their efforts inspected by their
superior in the hierarchy. Once they had successfully completed
this "use" phase, they were required to teach the same principles
and tools to their own subordinates, usually with the assistance
of a professional trainer. When the subordinates attempted to
apply the principles, the manager was required to work with them
as coach and inspector. This process was then repeated by
successive layers of the hierarchy until all had been trained.
The value of the LUTI process was that it forced every
manager in the firm to go through the training twice, once as a
student and once as a teacher, and to be involved in two
application sessions, once as a problem solver and once as a
coach/inspector. Through such repetition, the probability of the
new learnings being internalized was significantly increased,
thus facilitating buy-in to the new concepts. Additionally, the
LUTI process forced a "family" group to learn together, thus
facilitating the development of a shared language within the
group and encouraging reinforcement of the newly learned skills
through on-the-job interaction with co-workers.
The system was not without its flaws, however. Chief among
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them was that it overlooked the amount of time it typically takes
to internalize a set of new concepts. Thus, managers did not
really teach their subordinates, they were merely there to
provide a supportive presence while someone who really understood
the concepts taught them. Additionally, effectively inspecting
the output of others assumed that the new concepts were both
thoroughly understood and valued and that managers knew how to
evaluate and coach the performance of others. Often this was not
the case. with experience, however, these weaknesses were
recognized and addressed. Particularly useful, in this regard,
was an inspection workshop that helped managers to understand
inspection as a process of supportive questioning designed to
help others to understand their own thought processes more
clearly.
Create Mechanisms To Celebrate Success
Massive cultural change takes a severe toll on an
organization. Established patterns are disrupted. Employees
must struggle to learn and apply new concepts and skills. Even
more painfully, they must discard old behaviors that are no
longer appropriate.
In such an environment of change in a large and very complex
organization, it is easy to lose sight of where the organization
is going. The struggle to change, with all its attendant
frustrations, dominates the consciousness of employees, from shop
floor workers to senior executives. When success, does occur, it
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is very important that it be identified and celebrated. Xerox
clearly saw this need and developed mechanisms for celebrating
success. Most noteworthy among these is Teamwork Day. This
event was and is a massive glorification of the collective
struggle to improve. It is a cultural happening. For those
groups of employees who are chosen to display their improvement
projects, it provides powerful recognition that their efforts are
valued. For those employees who simply attend to view the
successes of others, it provides a re-affirmation of the
principles of Leadership Through Quality and an opportunity to
re-energize themselves for future improvement activities. Given
the long time period required for cultural renewal, such
reinforcement activities are critical, else frustration and
disillusionment will side-track the improvement program.
Top-Down Change Is Required When Orqanizational Culture Must Be
Transformed
Xerox embarked upon its renewal effort because of stress in
its technical system. Basically, the firm's internal production
environment was inefficient and was placing a competitive tax on
its products in speed of development, quality and cost. The
firm's initial solution to this problem was a QWL program that
sought improvements in how work was done through employee
involvement. While this initiative was sanctioned by senior
management, it could not be said that the program involved
management in an active way. This was a distinctly voluntary
grass-roots effort, largely facilitated by staff. It was only
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modestly successful in turning around corporate performance
because it confronted fundamental beliefs about how work should
be done and threatened established power bases. As a result,
°Dly a minority of employees chose to be involved and managerial
intransigence was often in evidence. Clearly the cultural and
political systems of the organization were not yet ready for this
type of work re-design effort.
Leadership Through Quality was created to address the
cultural and political aspects to corporate renewal. It was
developed by senior line managers to provide an unequivocal
message that improvements in Xerox's competitive position
required massive cultural change. Most important, however, it
clearly stated that cultural change required managerial change.
As the most influential "carriers" of the culture, Xerox managers
were being told that the established patterns of managing the
enterprise were no longer appropriate. There would be little
tolerance for behavior that was incompatible with the quality
improvement activities. The LTQ strategy document contained
specific prescriptions for what acceptable managerial behavior
would look like and outlined the infrastructural changes that
would support such behavior. It was a comprehensive, totally
integrated change program designed to bring about cultural change
in the shortest possible time frame. Such a program could only
be developed and driven by the very top of the organization.
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